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Abstract
Policies to regulate and support labor markets in the United States have mainly been an
initiative of the federal government.  Historically, states and localities were reluctant to act
independently to build up worker rights and protections for fear of competitively disadvantaging
resident industries with added costs.  Federal constitutional authority to raise revenue and control
commerce among the states governed development of labor market policy in the United States.  
Labor market support initiatives usually have been forged in difficult economic times with
contributions and compromise from the full political spectrum.  This paper examines the
development of employment policy in the twentieth century by viewing the interplay of federal,
state, and local partners.  The programs considered include unemployment insurance, training,
youth programs, and the employment service.  Some attention is also given to governmental
policy that influences the geographic mobility of labor.  Intergovernmental relations in labor
market policy have resulted in a system that performs a wide variety of functions, varies greatly at
the local and state levels, but maintains important federal standards nationwide.
1Seventeenth-century labor shortages were first addressed by indentured servitude of poor Europeans in
exchange for transportation costs (Faulkner and Starr; 1957, pp. 22-24). Agreements sometimes included a headright
that promised acreage upon completion of the contract and oftentimes apprenticeship.  Bad experience with indentured
servants led to a rise in use of enslaved Africans.  The practice of slavery was legally abolished by the presidential
Emancipation Proclamation in 1863.  Enforcement required the Civil War in 1861-1865.  Transition to regular non-
indentured employment often included periods of share-cropping by African Americans on southern plantations.  Some
labor market issues related to race were not fully addressed until the XIII, XIV, and XV amendments to the
Constitution became effective in 1865, 1868 and 1870 respectively, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed.  The
19th century witnessed the rise of trade and industrial labor unions and establishment of a large number of public
institutions for higher education on land granted by the federal government to many of the states (Morill Act of 1862).
2In 1870, farm work was the main employment for 53 percent of the labor force.  By 1900 that percentage had
dropped to 37.5.  It further declined to 21.4 percent by 1930, to 8.3 percent by 1960, and to 2.7 percent by 1990.
(Tostlebe, 1957; Jacobs, 1998)  
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I. Introduction
Policies to regulate and support labor markets in the United States have mainly been an
initiative of the federal government.  Historically, states and localities were reluctant to act
independently o build up worker rights and protections, for fear of competitively disadvantaging
resident industries with added costs.  Federal leadership has permitted states to address important
labor market issues with a diminished risk of job loss to competing states.  Furthermore, in many
cases federal law permits states to establish practices that adapt to the economic and cultural
conditions of the region.  The interplay of federal, state, and local partners in labor market policy has
resulted in a system that varies greatly at the local and state level, but maintains important federal
standards nationwide.
Federal constitutional authority to raise revenue and control commerce among the states
governed evelopment of labor market policy in the United States.  The history of this process is
mainly a 20th century story.1  The rights of workers to organize, conditions of employment, and
policies to address unemployment are concerns of an industrial society where the majority of people
live in cities separated from the subsistence naturally provided by the land in agrarian cultures.2
Trade unions, with origins in workingmen’s associations, and later industrial unions were born
in tandem with the rise of the factory system during the 19th century.  Until after the end of the 19th
century, custom and power determined working arrangements in states and local areas.  Union
strength grew during harsh conditions following bank panics in the 1830s and unions emerged by the
end of the century as general advocates for improved wages and working conditions.  Prior to the
great economic depression of the 1930s, federal legislation about workplace issues focused mainly
on rights to organize unions and collectively bargain about wages and conditions of work.
23Alchian and Allen (1972, p. 431).  
4Jackson (1986, pp. 4-5).  An excellent narrative about the legal context of union rights is given by Levitan,
Carlson, and Shapiro (1986, pp. 131-152).  
5Kalet (1987, pp. 1-12) documents the development and application of wage and hour laws in the United
States. 
6The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
7Kalet (1987, p. 2).  
8 Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act of 1936, McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1965, Davis-Bacon
Act of 1931, and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act of 1962.
9Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 and Child Support Enforcement Act of 1984.  
Some state and local courts used the federal Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 to stop union
activity in “restraint of trade.”  The Clayton Act of 1914 expressly excluded union activity as a
violation.3  The 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act further restricted judiciary power to prevent unions from
engaging in strikes, picketing and boycotts.  The Wagner Act of 1935, also known as the National
Labor Relations Act, further extended the privileges of unions and created the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) to administer and enforce provisions of the Act.  The Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, also called the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), refined the collective bargaining
environment by somewhat limiting union rights and guaranteeing certain freedoms of speech and
conduct to employers and to non-union employees.4  
Federal laws concerning hours and wages were first enacted in 1892 and 1913.5  These
applied only to federal public works projects, but established the eight-hour day and overtime pay at
the rate of one-and-one-half times the basic rate as basic principles.  Three later federal laws
established more general minimum standards for wages, overtime pay, and equal pay for equal work.6
Many states passed their own versions of these laws.  “Under principles established in the U.S.
Constitution, states may pass laws that are stricter, but not less stringent, than the federal apparatus.”7
The state laws were upheld by the courts and the federal laws were found constitutional because of
Congress’ right to regulate interstate commerce.  
Another series of federal laws established “prevailing wage rate” laws requiring standards for
wages and employment by establishments receiving federal government contracts or grants.8  This
same federal lever was used in the 1990s to prohibit illegal drug use from the work-place and to
permit drug testing of employees.  More recent federal laws have been directed at protecting specific
classes of individuals through employer practices involving payroll deductions.9  
Just as the union movement gained strength during the economic depression following the
1830s bank panics, programs to address unemployment had their roots in periods of economic
malaise.  The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, which established the U.S. Employment Service, and the
Social Security Act of 1935, which established the federal-state system of  unemployment insurance,
both passed during the great economic depression that followed the 1929 stock market crash.  The
Employment Act of 1946, which came on the heels of World War II and was prompted by fears that
recession would follow the war time expansion, enunciated a federal government policy to “promote
310Samuelson (1973, p. 354).  
maximum employment, production and purchasing power.”10  Public job training programs for
dislocated workers began with the 1962 Manpower Development Training Act, which followed the
economic stagnation of the 1950s.  
The focus of this chapter is intergovernmental relations regarding employment policies directly
intended toaddress problems of unemployment in the United States during the 20th century.  The
main policies examined concern unemployment compensation, job skill retraining, youth employment
promotion, and public employment exchange services.  Attention is also given to issues of employing
the economically disadvantaged, also known as welfare-to-work, and conditions for occupational
mobility within the country.  We examine these policies with an eye toward understanding how the
institutional, political, and economic context of their evolution has influenced the effectiveness of their
operation.  
II. The Institutional and Political Context of Employment Policy
Government action to promote employment has always been initiated in times of crisis.  The
federal-state unemployment insurance program was conceived in the widespread hardship experienced
from job loss during the 1930s.  Federal training policy also had its origin in depression era New Deal
programs for public works, and was reborn many years later in post-war recessions of the 1950s.
Youth employment policy began during the First World War and saw change during crisis periods
throughout the 20th century.  
The debate over employment policy approaches among federal policymakers involves the
President or chief of the executive branch of government, and Congress, which is the legislative
branch.  The federal legislature is bicameral.  It is made up of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.  The third branch of federal government, the courts, also occasionally intervene. Virtually all
elected and appointed federal officials in these three branches of government are members of either
the more liberal Democratic party or the more conservative Republican party.  Democrats maintain
that government has a responsibility to assist individuals who cannot support themselves, asserting
that government assistance is an entitlement.  Republicans contend that public assistance obliges the
recipient to work, in exchange for government support.  
Proposed federal legislation is introduced in the Congress as a bill, and becomes law only after
debate, refinement, and approval by both houses of Congress and signature by the president.  Federal
courts may later rule on the constitutionality of laws.  Program funding can be authorized only by the
House of Representatives.  Legislation can move through the system quickly if there is either
bipartisan support, or if one party holds majorities in both the House and Senate and holds the office
of  President.  Interestingly, laws regarding social and economic policy have always benefitted from
bipartisan i put even during the few times that one political party controlled both the legislative and
executive branches of federal government.  
411See, for example, the papers in Layard and Calmfors (1987).  
12Summers (1986) emphasized that dislocated adult married male workers suffered as greatly as any group
and despaired at the lack of macro policy tools available to address the situation because of huge federal budget deficits
and persistent threats of inflation.  
While political pundits may view employment policy of the twentieth century as a story of lost
battles on both political sides, moderates would see the resulting legislation as a rich blend of policies
that address competing objectives.  A key element in most compromise federal employment laws is
provisions for program evaluation to identify if programs are sufficiently cost effective.  Nonetheless,
employment program administrators would probably view the buffeting from frequent changes over
the years as an unfortunate distraction resulting from the political process.
The national government is actually a confederation of 50 states, the federal District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and a number of territories and protectorates.
Authority is reserved to these sub-national administrative divisions for all things not controlled by the
federal government.  States have governmental systems with three branches and the same inherent
checks and balances as the federal government.  Sub-state divisions called counties contain cities,
towns, and villages.  The federal government pursues employment policy through its authority to levy
taxes and to regulate interstate and international commerce.  The federal power to raise revenue by
taxes provides the means for financing public projects.  When financial grants are given by the federal
government to sub-national governmental agencies or others subject to stipulated requirements,
federal influence is wielded through the “power of the purse.”  
III. The Economic Context of Employment Policy
To set the economic context for employment policy, this section presents data describing the
labor market and employment program use in the United States during the last half of the 20th
century.  For 1997, which is the most recent year for which data are available, info m tion is given
for the whole country and for each individual state.  National data is also given for each of the 50
preceding years.
Table 1 presents data on unemployment, labor force participation, and the size of the civilian
labor force in 1997 for the nation and the states.  Table 2 gives data on the same variables for the
nation in each year dating back to 1947.  
For 1997, the national average unemployment rate stood at 4.9 percent.  This is well below
the level generally believed by economists in the 1980s to be consistent with price stability.11  It is also
a surprising turn of events for economists who had accepted high unemployment rates during business
cycle peaks as inevitable.12  Furthermore, unemployment dipped to 4.5 percent in 1998 and the
aggregate price level remained virtually unchanged.  While unemployment was higher in places like
Alaska, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, the job market in most of the country was
exceptionally strong.  From Table 2 it can be seen that it has been 25 years or more since such rates
of unemployment have been experienced in the United States.  Such thriving job markets make for
a politically opportune time for attempts at moving public assistance recipients into regular work. 
513Massachusetts and Washington offer up to 30 weeks.  Tabl s 3 and 4 tabulate actual potential duration of
beneficiaries, which often is less than the maximum depending on prior work experience.  
14O’Leary (1998) examines in detail the gross aggregate and other measures of wage replacement.  The
finding of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) that dislocated workers experience substantial declines (20 to 40
percent) in reemployment earnings vis-a-vis prior earnings suggests that UI benefits replace a much larger share of
potential reemployment earnings.  
Special programs for employment assistance in the United States are targeted to minorities,
youth, and dislocated workers—who are long-term unemployed or lack skills demanded in their local
labor market.  In Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that unemployment rates for blacks and youth are
always higher, both across states and over time, than for the labor force as a whole.  A disturbing
phenomenon is the comparatively slow rate of unemployment decline for these groups in recent years
while the general labor market has improved.  Fairlie and Sundstrom (1999) find that there has
actually been a recent widening of the racial unemployment gap.  
Another disappointing phenomenon is that the recent expansion has witnessed a larger
proportion of the unemployed who are out of work long-term than at peaks of earlier business
expansions.  By 1998, 14.1 percent of the unemployed were long-term (27 weeks or more), although
the long-term share of unemployment had dipped to 9.9 percent in 1989 and to 8.87 percent in 1979.
It appears that with a lower overall rate of unemployment, the remaining unemployed job seekers are
more difficult to reemploy.  Within states, there is however a direct relationship between the rate of
unemployment and the proportion out of work long-term.  
The overall labor force participation rate in the United States is now at a post-World War II
high of 67.1 percent of the non-institutional civilian population.  The female rate is near a historic
peak, while the male labor force participation rate has slowly declined over the past 50 years.  All this
has occurred during a period of dramatic growth in the civilian labor force, which has witnessed more
than a doubling from 59.4 million in 1947 to 137.7 million in 1998.
The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system provides temporary partial wage
replacement to involuntarily unemployed job seekers with significant labor force attachment.  It is the
primary mode of public income replacement for such persons.  Table 3 presents data on four UI
features: benefit amounts, replacement rates, duration rates, recipiency in 1997 for the nation and the
states.  This table also provides information on public assistance receipt, the extent of poverty, and
union density.  Table 4 gives data on the same variables for the nation in each year dating back to
1947.  
The maximum potential duration of UI benefits is nearly uniform across states at 26 weeks.13
Most state laws approximate 50 percent wage replacement between the minimum and maximum
weekly benefit amount.  UI is social insurance.  It aims to prevent descent into poverty, not to insure
all wage loss, resulting in the gross aggregate wage replacement rate of around one-third.14  There
has been a long-term decline in the proportion of the eligible unemployed who actually draw UI
615Burtless (1983) cited a variety of reasons for the decline including a broadening of UI coverage, tightened
eligibility requirements, imposition of taxation of UI benefits, and high implicit taxes on other sources of income such
as pensions.  Bassi and McMurrer (1998) and Vroman have disputed whether or not the decline in recipiency is also
a result of interstate competition for business location and retention which some label a “race to the bottom.”
16See Woodbury and Rubin (1997) for details.  
17Employment policy spending as a percent of GDP is quite modest in the United States compared to other
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries.  Among 22 OECD countries
in 1992, only Japan had a lower share of GDP devoted to employment policy.  In 1992 the Japanese unemployment
rate was about one-quarter the rate in the U.S.  Nearly all other OECD countries spent 2 percent or more of GDP on
employment policy.  (OECD, 1994, p. 101)
benefits.  This has become a prime policy concern.  In recent years, significant attention has been
focused on reasons for the decline in UI recipiency.15   
In 1997 UI provided an average of $193 per week for an average of 14.6 weeks out of work.
The weekly benefit replaced 33.5 percent of lost wages, and was available for an average of up to
23.9 weeks.  Only 34.5 percent of all unemployed persons received UI benefits in 1997.  Average
weekly benefits ranged from $134 in Louisiana to $269 in Hawaii.  
Over the past decade, the proportion of the population receiving public assistance not linked
to labor force participation has remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 6.2 and 7.8 percent.
Recent welfare reforms including welfare-to-work programs are expected to continue the recent
downward trend in caseloads fostered by the booming U.S. economy of the late 1990s.
Simultaneously there has been a modest decline in the proportion of the population living below the
poverty line.  Over a longer time frame, the poverty rate has fallen from 22.4 percent in 1957 to 13.3
percent of the non-institutional population in 1997.  
Important in understanding the labor market context of employment policy is to know
something about union density; that is, the proportion of wage and salary workers who are union
members.  From 1973 to 1997, union density has fallen from 24 to 14.1 percent of the labor force.
There is some evidence that the steady decline is gradually reversing during the current economic
expansion, yet dramatic declines are undeniable.  Over this period Freeman (1989) found the largest
declines to be in manufacturing (-13 percent), construction (-16 percent), transportation-
communication-utilities (-15 percent), and mining (-17 percent).  Union density remained low but
relatively stable in service and trade industries.  
To put into perspective the importance of employment policy in the United States economy,
Table 4 lists UI benefit payments, and total spending on labor market policy (including UI) as
proportions of gross domestic product (GDP) for the country.  Only in one year, 1975, did spending
on UI exceed 1 percent of GDP.  In that year, three successive grants of extended UI benefits resulted
in eligibility of up to 65 weeks for many claimants.16  Spe ding on UI is typically in the range of one-
third to one-half of one percent of GDP.  Naturally the share is higher in recessions and lower in years
of expanding employment.  Spending on employment programs other than UI tends to average about
one-tenth of one percent of GDP.17  
718Blaustein (1993, pp. 151-153).  
19A history of the process is given by Blaustein (1993, pp. 107-129).  
20Much of this material is drawn from West and Hildebrand (1997).  
IV. Employment Policy in Action
The prior sections provided some background on the institutional, political, and economic
context of intergovernmental arrangements for addressing the problem of unemployment; this section
examines programs for unemployment compensation, job skill retraining, and youth employment
promotion.  The discussion of unemployment compensation is somewhat longer than the treatment
given other programs.  This is because the difficulties encountered and solutions found in shaping the
federal-state UI system largely established the pattern for intergovernmental relations in employment
policy.  In the part on retraining, some attention is given to issues of employing the economically
disadvantaged, now known as welfare-to-work.  Conditions for occupational mobility within the
country are also examined.  Our aim is to elucidate how the intergovernmental and economic context
of program evolution has influenced the nature and effectiveness of service delivery.  
Unemployment Compensation
The federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) was established in the United States
by the Social Security Act of 1935.  Title III of the Act established federal grants to the states to
perform administrative functions for UI, and Title IX established the federal unemployment tax and
related provisions.18  The tax provisions established incentive conditions that showed federal genius
for initiating the system among states with varying degrees of unemployment and concern about
worker hardship.  While principles for the financing of benefits are now widely accepted, the financing
of administration remains an area of federal-state contention in UI policy.  
The UI system was a key element of  President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s social policy initiative
entitled the New Deal that aimed to lift the country out of the Great Depression.  The federal-state
UI system has five main goals: (1) to provide temporary partial wage replacement during involuntary
unemployment, (2) to prevent dispersal of employers' workforce, (3) to promote rapid return to
work, (4) to limit business downturns by maintaining aggregate purchasing power, and (5) to
encourage stabilization of employment in enterprises through experience rating.
Prior to the Social Security Act, there were several attempts to establish a single federal
system for unemployment compensation.19  In 1932, Wisconsin enacted the first state UI law.  In
1934, president Roosevelt appointed the Committee on Economic Security to study how best to
establish an unemployment compensation system.20  Ulti ately the Committee recommended a
federal-state system for UI.  The recommendation was probably influenced by the knowledge that
President Roosevelt favored such a system.  Furthermore, the Great Depression lead many to believe
that unemployment is due to national rather than local economic events.  However, Congress did not
wish to usurp all state authority on such matters and feared that the courts might find a wholly federal
system be unconstitutional.  
821Failure to conform or comply with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) provisions means state
employers lose tax offset credits, and the state will not receive an administrative grant.  Failure to conform or comply
with Social Security Act provisions means the state will not receive an administrative grant.  
22Further detail is given by Blaustein (1993, pp. 157-158) and Rosbrow (1986, pp. 7-8). 
23Institutional relations are explained by West and Hildebrand (1997) and Rubin (1983), while the incentive
structure is described by Burgess and Kingston (1987).  
The federal-state UI system represented an entirely new model for intergovernmental
relations.  It was not a federal system like the old age insurance provisions of the Social Security Act.
Neither was it a system of federal grants to the states like public assistance matching grants.  A clever
incentive structure was established to create the system.  A uniform federal tax was imposed on
payrolls, but a 90 percent credit of this tax was granted in states operating approved UI programs.
Currently the federal unemployment tax is 6 percent on the first $7,000 paid to each worker
each year.  If a state does not have an outstanding debt to the federal unemployment account, if state
UI law conforms with federal law, and if an individual employer has paid the state UI taxes on time,
then a 90 percent credit of the federal tax is given to the employer, leaving a federal UI tax rate of
0.6 percent.  Currently there is also a 0.2 percent federal surtax, which brings the federal
unemployment tax paid by employers to the U.S. Treasury up to 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 paid
to each worker in a year.  Federal law also requires the maximum state UI tax rate to be at least 5.4
percent on the first $7,000 in earnings per year.  Credits that lower the state contribution rate may
be given to employers if done through a state experience rating system for UI taxes that has been
approved by the U.S. Department of Labor.  The maximum UI tax rate in many states is 5.4 percent,
but it is higher in most states. 
Money not rebated by the federal government is used to finance program administration
through grants to the states and to make loans to the states when liquidity problems arise in paying
benefits.  The conformity requirements originally set in the Social Security Act of 1935 addressed
only rules for administration and coverage.  Penalties to states for failure to conform with federal law
may result in withholding state administration funds and/or denial of the 90 tax credit to employers.21
Legal challenges to state and federal UI laws were filed right after taxes became payable by
employers on January 1, 1936.22  The United States Supreme Court on May 24, 1937, found federal
law to be constitutional.  The high court ruled that (1) states enacting conforming UI laws reaped a
federal tax advantage for employers, and (2) states did not act under duress, but were free to choose
this advantage.  The court opinion also cited general hardship during the great depression and a need
to respond since 1929; furthermore, the court cited the states’ reluctance to competitively
disadvantage state employers.  Many political observers at the time asserted that such a ruling was
only possible because of democratic party appointments to the court made by President Roosevelt.
The existing federal-state UI system is a delicate balance of power that is self-regulated to a
great extent by a built-in incentive structure.23  Each side of the system has many faces.  The federal
924This analysis was developed by West and Hildebrand (1997, pp. 593-596).  
25In 1939 federal l w moved UI tax provisions to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act as part of the federal
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) code.  A 1940 federal law required that pay rates for employees of state employment
security departments be merit based. 
26See Eberts and O’Leary (1997) for a discussion of profiling in the United States and elsewhere.  
partner includes the U.S. Congress, the federal executive branch that includes the U.S. Department
of Labor (its national and regional offices) and the Office of Management and Budget, and the federal
courts.  The state partner includes 50 states, the federal district (DC), 2 territories (Puerto Rico and
Virgin Islands), the state legislatures, many state UI advisory councils, business and labor
organizations, state courts, and state UI agencies with local offices.
As during initiation of the system, the federal partner continues to hold the upper hand in the
relationship.  Key to regulating the system are federal requirements for conformity and compliance.24
That is, state UI laws must conform with federal law, and actual state practice must comply with
federal law.  The Social Security Act of 1935 provided 12 minimal requirements; two requirements
were added about the use of UI granted funds during the early 1940s; new federal laws in the 1950s
required coverage to be broadened; and in 1970 and 1976, many new requirements were added.25
In recent years, an overriding federal concern has been controlling federal spending, consequently
changes to the UI system have often been done as part of the budget reconciliation process, because
the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) is treated as part of the federal budget.
A chronology of conformity requirements is given in Table 5.  The original requirements
regarded prompt payment of benefits, location of payments, appeals procedures, management of
funds, reporting to the U.S. Department of Labor, and the requirement of experience rating as the
basis for lowering contribution rates below the federal maximum.  Requirements added in the 1940s
and 1950s were included mainly to simplify procedures when interstate claims were involved.  In
more recent years, federal conformity requirements have become somewhat more specific and
questionable from the state perspective, governing things like the amount of reemployment required
to qualify after a benefit denial, the non-payment of benefits to professional athletes in the off season,
and rules for reducing benefits based on pension income.  After 1969, when the UI trust fund was
included in the federal unified budget, several requirements were added to conserve UI funds and
improve the overall budget picture.  A prime example of this action is the 1994 law that required
profiling of claimants so as to make early referral to reemployment services for those most likely to
exhaust UI benefits.26
Federal rules have become increasingly specific.  In particular, new provisions permitting use
of UI trust fund money to promote self-employment limits state discretion.  Eleven new restrictions
are required for this program alone.  Interestingly, there have never been conformity requirements
on basic matters like the level of the weekly benefit amount and the duration of benefits.  However,
the U.S. Department of Labor and federal advisory commissions have offered guidelines to states on
10
27See O’Leary and Rubin (1997) about benefit levels and Woodbury and Rubin (1997) about benefit durations.
28UI Performs is the current system for such monitoring.  An overview is provided by Skrable (1997).  
29Miller (1997, pp. 355-361) provides a clear and concise overview of funding flows.  The currently 80 percent
goes to ESAA, with the remaining 20 percent to EUCA.     
these matters.27   Recent years have seen increasing monitoring of compliance with federal guidelines
for accuracy and timeliness of benefit payments, appeals, and tax contributions.28  
Since originally ruling on the constitutionality of the federal-state UI system in 1937, judicial
involvement in the system has been minimal.  Two important cases bear mention.  In the case of Java
versus the California Department of Human Resources Development, the U.S. Supreme court in 1970
ruled a state may not suspend UI benefit payments during the process of an appeal of a benefit
eligibility denial.  This required nearly all states to change laws or administration to achieve
conformity.  In 1994, the seventh circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found for Pennington, who argued
benefit eligibility should be strictly based on demonstrated attachment to the labor force and not
necessarily on rules that are administratively simple to apply.  Pennington would have been eligible
for benefits were the most recent work quarters considered rather than the statutory “first 4 of the
last 5 quarters.”  The Pennington ruling required states to consider an alternate, more recent, base
year if the usual base year does not result in eligibility.  
Federal-state r lations in UI are tested on a regular basis through the required review by the
U.S. Department of Labor of proposed state legislation.  The relationship has also been greatly
affected in recent years by the federal budget implications of state actions.  Battle lines in this regard
have been clearest on the issue of  administrative financing.  Federal receipts from the states that are
not returned to state trust fund accounts to pay benefits flow into the Employment Security
Administration Account (ESAA).  Money in the ESAA is used to make grants to the states to finance
program administration, with some remaining money transferred to the Extended Unemployment
Compensation Account (EUCA) to pay for the federal share of extended benefits.29  
Federal grants to states for UI administration are done by a formula based on work load
factors uch as the number of UI claims, appeals, and covered employers.  The formula also depends
on the estimated time cost of serving claimants and salaries of office staff.  The tim cost estimates
used are based on studies done in the 1970s, with updates only as recent as 1984.  Since that time
there have been many changes in practices and office technology within the states.  The federal-state
struggle over administrative funding has been one of the most regular features of the system in recent
years.  Driven by budget tightness, the federal government has tried to conserve funds, while the
states have claimed that federal holdings for administration are state entitlements that should be
distributed.  Davidson and Martin (1996) have viewed the standoff as a classic principal-agent
problem.  The federal partner is the principal seeking to administer a high quality UI program through
its agents, the state employment security agencies.  Davidson and Martin argue that to encourage high
quality service, efficient low-cost administration, and continuous quality improvement, the
administrative funding mechanism should (1) be based on the quality of service as measured through
a simple monitoring system operated by the federal partner to assess state practice, and (2) permit
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30Federal-state t nsion over UI administrative funding led in 1954 to the Reed Act, which provides that when
the reserves in the federal UI administration, loan, and extended benefits account exceed a certain threshold level, the
excess be returned to the states.  States may use Reed Act money to finance either regular UI benefits or administrative
costs.  In recent years, the federal government has avoided Reed Act distributions to conserve federal money.  The
proposed legislation would guarantee grants to states if UI benefit reserves were sufficient and if the money was used
to fund UI administration.  
31In Massachusetts and Washington, the maximum duration is 30 weeks.  
states to retain unspent financial grants.  Special administrative grants could also be made to states
with high unemployment or low population density where administrative costs are higher because of
these factors but not because of inefficiency.  Such a system will also have the effect of encouraging
UI tax payers to monitor administrative efficiency at the local and state level, so as to increase the
share of administrative grants retained for other uses including benefit payments.  
In recent years, federal-state conflict about the issue of fund solvency has been waning.  The
federal government holds 53 separate state unemployment trust fund accounts for payment of
benefits.  Federal guidelines recommended by the U.S. Department of Labor and federal advisory
commissions on UI have advocated forward funding of benefits.  That is, reserves in state
unemployment trust fund accounts should be sufficient to pay benefits if unemployment were to rise
dramatically.  In recent years states have generally not met the reserve adequacy standards, preferring
instead to restrain tax rates and leave money in the hands of the private sector where jobs might be
created.  States have been content to rely on their possibility to borrow from the Federal
Unemployment Account (FUA) to preserve sufficient liquidity for payment of UI benefits.  Federal
pressure for high reserve levels may have been motivated by budgetary considerations.  Interestingly,
recent recommendations from the independent Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
(1995) called for relaxed forward funding targets for states.  In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor
has helped prepare new rules to be considered as part of federal legislation that encourage improved
trust fund reserves with a reward to states of additional administrative financing grants.30  
An area of excellent cooperation between the federal and state partners is that of extended
UI benefits.  The maximum duration of benefits in all but two states is 26 weeks, or half a year.31  The
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 created a permanent program for extended UI
benefits when unemployment rates exceeded certain preset trigger levels.  The state and federal
governments equally share the cost of paying benefits extended by 50 percent of the stat  duration
up to 13 weeks under this permanent program.  It has been a model of cooperation.  
Payment of income support to out-of-work job seekers is coordinated in a variety of ways
with other programs.  Foremost perhaps are arrangements to assure free mobility of job seekers
across tate borders by making arrangements for interstate UI benefit claims.  Interstate agreements
forged with federal support permit any state where a claim is filed to act as an agent for another state
when the majority of base period income was earned in that other state.  The agent state determines
eligibility, disqualifications, and the amount and duration of benefits based on rules in the state where
the majority of base period wages were earned.  The 1970 amendments to the federal UI statutes
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32Corson (1997) provides an examination of UI interactions with other federal and state programs.  
33A thorough examination of the UI-ES relationship is given by Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz (1997).  
34Vroman (1997) reports on activities of the seven states using UI to promote self-employment.  Originally
temporary authority was granted by federal law, but the self-employment provisions were made permanent in 1998.
It is likely more states will soon adopt such provisions. 
further clarified the way in which earnings from more than one state are combined to determine
entitlement and to attribute liability to the benefit charge experience of prior employers.  
In addition to regular state UI benefits and extended benefits, there are federal UI benefit
programs for previous federal employees of military and government agencies.  Like interstate claims,
states act as agents for the federal government in administering these programs.  Federal guidelines
also direct states on how to coordinate UI with other programs, including temporary disability
insurance, workers compensation, public old age insurance, and private pensions.32
The strongest link between UI and another program is via the work test that is administered
in many states by the public employment service (ES).  That is, in order to retain UI eligibility,
beneficiaries must demonstrate an active job search which in many states requires registration with
and use of ES services.  The 1935 federal statues required state UI claims to be filed in public ES
offices, the implicit idea was to emphasize reemployment.  Federal legislation establishing the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services system in 1993 strengthened the UI-ES link, a relationship that
should continue to grow as ES offices transform to serve a central role as one-stop career centers
under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998.33  The UI link to reemployment through retraining is
permitted by state commissioner job search waivers granted to beneficiaries referred to approved
training programs.  Work search exemption is also granted to beneficiaries permitted to pursue self-
employment under UI laws in seven states authorized by provisions of the federal North American
Free Trade Act (NAFTA) of 1993.34  
During the Great Depression, the federal-state UI system paved the constitutional path for
federal involvement in state employment policy at a time when states feared handicapping competitive
possibilities for resident employers by imposing taxes.  Economic theorists like Hoyt (1996) have
shown that the structure of federal-state relations (1) induces higher UI tax rates in states with more
labor force members, (2) causes a positive relationship between taxes in neighboring states, and (3)
has bigger spillover UI tax effects from larger neighboring states.  
Weaver (1996) has asserted that interstate competition for jobs has resulted in states trying
to provide minimal UI protection while often shunting low-wage workers toward public assistance
programs, which receive sizeable federal fun ing supplements.  He has labeled this phenomenon as
a “race to the bottom.”  Bassi and McMurrer (1998) estimate that such interstate competition has
resulted in a federal-state program only about two-thirds the size it would be otherwise.  Independent
empirical work by Vroman (1998) has challenged this startling estimate, but the question remains an
open one.  Furthermore, while federal influence over the UI system shows no imminent signs of
waning, authority for other social programs is increasingly being turned over to the states.  The
13
empirical questions about the nature of decentralized state dominated UI system could be answered
by experience in the near future.   
Training
Public works programs during the Great Depression included some on-the-job training, but
focused federally funded job skill training policy in the United States began with the Manpower
Development Training Act (MDTA) of 1962.  Public acceptance of the depression era New Deal
programs grew out of widespread hardship experienced from job loss during the 1930s.  Renewed
training efforts thirty years later were greatly influenced by the political struggles fought during
President Johnson’s War on Poverty.  
In the 1960s, with the civil rights movement gaining momentum and the public assistance
welfare roles expanding, the unemployed became a focal point.  Women workers, blacks, and the
young all continued to experience high unemployment rates despite continuing improvements in the
economy.  The Johnson administration’s War on Poverty was targeted toward racial minorities and
youth.  A major objective of the resulting legislation was to help the most disadvantaged achieve
employability and secure jobs with a living wage.  Some lacked work experience, and many had
multiple barriers to steady mployment.  The belief was that the major employment problem of the
disadvantaged was theirlack of marketable job skills.  Consequently it was agreed that the federal
government eeded to provide a full range of services for the poor including remedial education,
occupational skill training, work experience, and counseling.  
Under the MDTA, training was viewed as an anti-poverty program, and the federal
government took a centralized and categorical approach to eradicating poverty.  Funding from the
federal government was targeted to specific groups.  Funds were available on a formula basis to
communities based on population and estimates of the proportion below the poverty income level.
The federal government managed funding through 12 regional offices, each of which supervised
activity in four to six states.  Oftentimes, competing agencies within localities bid against each other
for federal funding by submitting separate proposals to regional offices for review, this despite
preestablished criteria which included ensuring a “geographically equitable” distribution of the
available funds.  Congress and the President determined the total amount of funds available through
their annual budget negotiations.  
The federal effort during the 1960s developed into a piecemeal approach, which reflected the
belief that there were divergent needs among the individual groups who were the expected
beneficiaries of the myriad of policies.  In addition, the political reality resulted in the spreading of
functions among many different departments and agencies in the federal government.  Each
department i volved in the distribution received directives from a different piece of legislation.  The
grants did not interrelate with one another and often were a duplication of effort.  The need for
coordination at the highest levels became painfully obvious.
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35Palmer (1983, p. 9). 
During the 1960s, it was not unusual to find communities having similar programs located
within a few city blocks of one another targeting services to technically distinct but frequently
overlapping groups.  For example, a neighborhood center providing services to assist black youth in
obtaining employment and a public school providing employment services to minority youth, could
easily overlap and duplicate efforts.  The more-ingenious clients were often able to receive similar
services from more than one agency.  
Since cost has always been a primary concern in service delivery, such duplication and waste
was an easy target for critics of government involvement in employment policy.  Advocates for more
assistance argued that unemployment has a long-term cost not only in foregone production for society
but in personal hardship that cannot be easily measured.  A common view among program operators
was that the federal government promoted solutions but failed to provide sufficient funding to truly
address the problems.  More pronounced in the 1960s was recognition at the local level that there
were gross inefficiencies due to the categorical nature of programs and the centralized control by the
federal government.
The 1970s brought a more comprehensive approach to addressing the problems of the
economically disadvantaged.  The bureaucratic buzz words “decategorize” and “decentralize”
became the theme of the decade.  Decentralization meant the transfer of authority from federal to
state and local government.  Authority given was defined in the legislation and regulations, it often
included the responsibility for designing, implementing and to some extent, evaluating program
activities.  Decategorization meant that federal appropriations were no longer earmarked for specific
programs; a local determination could be made after analyzing the needs of the disadvantaged
population.  
In addition, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 introduced
the concept of a local advisory board to assure that local public interest would guide program
planning.  The council membership and role were established in the regulations, and in some localities
representation was “guaranteed” for constituencies like education and labor.  As it turned out,
advisory councils evolved differently across the country.  Some were merely “rubber stamps,” while
others had a significant role that included on-site monitoring and local policy development.  The
worst case scenarios occurred when council members took advantage of their position to provide
funding to preferred organizations.  
 The arrival of the Reagan administration in 1981 led to a “conservative challenge” on the
principles, policies and programs of the liberal tradition of federal activism in economic and social
affairs as it evolved in the half of the century starting with the new deal.35  The major objective of
legislation at this time was to increase earnings and employment as well as decrease welfare
dependency.  The classroom skill  training being provided was identified as a major weakness of these
programs since, it was often not the kind of training desired by local employers.  For example, critics
cited the training of welders in areas where there were job openings for welders.  Historically, the
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type of training was determined by the client and was not always in occupational areas that had high
demand and a career ladder in the local market.  
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 recommended limiting training choices to
skills that were in demand by local employers.  JTPA also increased the private sector share of
members on the advisory committees to ensure that their interests were taken into consideration.  By
1982, CETA-type public service employment programs were considered taboo because they were
expensive and the media had extensively documented instances of fraud and abuse.  More important
to shaping employment policy were the large and growing federal budget and foreign trade deficits.
These concerns created a policy environment ripe for a conservative swing. 
It was the involvement of the private sector that promised to make a major difference in the
lives of the poor by providing access to jobs that existed in local areas.  While there have been many
employers who have hired clients from the program, most individuals on these boards either have a
personal commitment to helping the poor or their company considers it a corporate responsibility to
volunteer.  Seldom did advisory board members themselves recruit employees from among those
enrolled in the program.  
The natural evolution of programs seemed to call for a range of services and programs based
on individual needs.  Careful assessment and a holistic, family-centered case management approach
were the logical next steps, particularly if complemented by what we had learned about locally
designed programs, driven by the local labor market and supported by the local private sector.
However, economic conditions of the mid 1990s had improved to the point where full employment
existed in most of the United States. 
The more than 30 years of searching for ways to reduce poverty through employment policy
has evolved into a new approach that shifts responsibility from government to the individual, and
divests authority from the federal government to the states.  It exchanges an emphasis on skill training
that will lead a family out of poverty for an emphasis on job placement thatwill quickly reduce the
cost of public assistance payment.
On August 22, 1996 President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which reformed the nation’s welfare laws.  A new system of block
grants from the federal government to the states named Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) was created, changing the nature and provision of welfare benefits in America.  These block
grants were given with many fewer restrictions on state use.  The fundamental requirement is for
states to have most recipients working within two years of first receiving TANF benefits.  States are
largely free to choose the means to this end.  
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA), signed into law on August 7, 1998, includes many of
the political characteristics that are in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act.  Regulations have not yet been written for implementation of the WIA, but early
indications are that these two pieces of legislation will be very complimentary.  A significant
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36See for example Pavetti (1993), who estimated that nationally over 40 percent of such job placements cycle
back onto public assistance.  
difference may be that the WIA is built around the business-led Workforce Development Boards.  In
addition to business leaders, leaders from labor, education and community organizations sit on these
boards that each cover an area encompassing 500,000 people (smaller areas can be approved by
states).  Workforce Development Boards will establish one-stop career centers that provide “core
services” regardless of income or employment status of individuals seeking employment.
As was the case for previous employment policy legislation, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act and the Workforce Investment Act were compromise legislation.  This time
the political mood was that entitlement programs were not working, taxes were too high, and with
low unemployment, many believed that anyone who really wanted to work could find a job.  In
addition, a certain morality slipped into the preamble of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act, indicating a bias toward marriage, families, and the interests of children.
Funds under WIA are allocated to states, with governors enjoying much more discretion than
they had in prior legislation.  This is the devolution of the federal role.  Although a more direct
relationship between taxpayers and tax-supported programs has not yet materialized, many believe
that the shift to the states presages an eventual shift to local government.  Taxpayers may soon have
the opportunity to decide program funding at the local ballot box.  
Thirty-seven states enacted welfare reform programs before the federal Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families program was approved.  In fact, currently, all but four states have work-b sed
welfare.  This is a shift from the skill development approach of previous programs to a “work first”
approach that makes quick job placement the top priority.  This transformation to a work-based
system assumes that the best training is a job and that suitable jobs paying sufficient wages are
available.  
Not unlike earlier policy-makers, many current legislators apparently believe that it is only a
matter of getting the right match in the labor market. The opinion that a good match and work place
experience will result in stable employment has little support from employment policy practitioners.
Recent research suggests that low-wage jobs with few fringe benefits and no career path tend to have
high turnover.36
Greater coordination between federal programs is also the intent of the new legislation.
Unfortunately, the federal government has not taken the critical step of incorporating related
programs under a single administration with common definitions and common reporting requirements.
At the sub-state levels, a reduction in funding and the anticipated problems that will result when
clients begin exhausting their time limits has resulted in a new urgency for collaboration.  There have
been movements toward “one-stop centers” where clients can get access to a comprehensive list of
services.  These efforts are usually comprised of  “self-help”with and minimal intervention.
Establishing “one-stop centers” as the access point for employment and training services is mandated
in the WIA.  Public job placement services, unemployment compensation, welfare-to-work assistance,
17
37Temporary exemption may be granted for medical reasons (up to 30 days), pregnancy (after 6 months), or
to provide care to an infant less than three months old; long-term disabilities are granted a temporary work exemption
while the disability is evaluated by Social Security Administration for long-term disability insurance benefits.  Longer-
term exemptions include Social Security Insurance, Social Security Disability Insurance, and State Disability Insurance;
in all these cases, a physical or mental disability must have been diagnosed.   
vocational and rehabilitation services must all be available at least at one physical site in each
Workforce Investment Area.
In a typical state-administered welfare-to-work program, the primary eligibility requirement
is that participants are receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  The components
may vary between states or within states, but the desired outcome is clear: “work first” emphasizes
work as the focus for all nearly all individuals receiving public assistance.37
All new applicants for public assistance and all current recipients are assessed to determine
if any of the exempt classifications apply; if not, the individual is referred to a Work First service
provider.  Once referred to Work First, the individual must participate in work and/or job seeking
activities for at least 25 hours a week until they stop receiving benefits.  Failure to participate in job-
seeking activity or work is grounds for reduction or loss of public assistance payments.  
Once eligibility is satisfied, regulations establish the activities that are allowable.  These
activities are:
1. Unsubsidized Employment -This is the ultimate goal of all activities and it is
encouraged from the beginning, since it is believed by some that the sooner it is
accomplished, the lower the cost.
2. Subsidized Private-Sector Employment - The individual is an employee of a private-
sector employer. 
3. Subsidized Public-Sector Employment - The individual is an employee of a public-
sector employer.  The wages are supported by grant funds.
4. Work Experience Program - An unpaid training assignment for individuals who lack
previous employment experience and/or job readiness and who are, therefore, difficult to
place in unsubsidized employment.  The goal of work experience is to improve skills,
attitudes, and general employability of these individuals.
5. On-the-Job Training - The individual is an employee of the employer and training is
conducted on the job.  Reimbursement of the extraordinary training cost is provided to
the employer with grant funds.  The employee is expected to retain employment with the
employer.
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6. Job Search and Job Readiness Assistance - A tivities that help participants become
familiar with general workplace expectations and learn behavior and attitudes necessary
to compete successfully in the labor market.  Job search includes job clubs, counseling,
and job-seeking skills training.
7. Community Service Program - Community Service Programs are projects which serve
a useful purpose for the community or the public interest in fields such as health,
education, urban and rural development, welfare, recreation, public facilities, public
safety, and other purposes identified by the state.  The Community Service Program must
comply with the minimum wage requirements and other laws related to employment.
8. Post-Employment Training (Vocational Education) - Post-employment training is
defined as an occupational training component that may combine classroom, laboratory,
and other related activities and which is directly related to a specific occupational field or
specific job.
9. Job Skills Training - This is a classroom activity for recipients who have a specific
barrier to employment opportunities resulting from an identified need for skill training.
The skills being taught must be in demand by local employers; examples are, English as
a second language, remedial education, and basic math.  This is only for recipients who
have received a high school diploma or equivalency.  Example:  English as a second
language, remedial education, basic math.
10.Education directly related to employment - This is a classroom activity (a non-
occupational training activity) for recipients who have received a high school diploma.
Programs for Youth
Vocational Education.  The federal government has supported vocational education in
grades kindergarten (K) through 12 since passage of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917.  This act has
been re-authorized by the federal government about every five years.  Federal spending in support
of K-12 vocational education currently runs about $1 billion per year.  
Over the years, the federal role has alternately been either to encourage program development
or to promote equity.  Current policy is more focused on equity; that is, providing access to
vocational education for youth from low-income, minority, or otherwise disadvantaged households.
States and local school districts pay the major share of vocational education costs.
Historically, localities determine the content of curriculum for all types of K-12 education, and
vocational education is no different.  Local school boards are accountable for curriculum.  For a
district o receive a federal vocational education grant, there must be an employer advisory board.
Most states require a similar arrangement to grant funding.
19
Technical Preparation.  Re-authorization of the Vocational Education Act during the mid-
1980s created a new curriculum called tech prep.  The idea was to have an analogue to the traditional
secondary course of study referred to as college prep.  The tech prep period is the final two years in
a vocational secondary school, designed to bolster a student's academic skills. This would prepare
a student to pursue a two-year associate’s degree in a technical field at community junior college.
This standard tech prep model is sometimes called “2 + 2.”  Some localities have extended the model
to “2 + 2 + 2” wherein an additional two years is spent at a university to complete a bachelor’s
degree, most likely in a technical field such as engineering.  
Obviously the tech prep programs require close cooperation between local school districts and
post-secondary institutions (like community colleges), which are often administered by the state. 
Funding is provided to local school districts by the federal government through the states.  
School-to-work.  The federal School-to-work Opportunities Act of 1994 directed new
services to all secondary school students, not just those enrolled in vocational programs.  The initial
authorization provided five years of funding to states and local school districts.  Activities permitted
under the program include (1) school-based activities, (2) work-based activities, and (3) activities
connecting school with work.  The act aims to develop collaboration between educators and
employers which will benefit all students in grades K through 12.  Particular activities include
mentoring, internships, part-time volunteer employment, and part-time paid work.  
Federal funding for school-to-work (STW) is seen as seed money to promote development
of state and local initiatives.  Five-year grants to each state range between $10 million and $50
million, depending on the state population and geographic size.  Disbursement of the money follows
an inverted V pattern.  Small amounts are given in years 1 and 5;  somewhat higher amounts are given
in years 2 and 4; the largest yearly allocation is given in year 3.  The rationale for this scheme is as
follows: year 1 involves mostly state planning with some initial local involvement; year 2, the state
is operational and some localities are more advanced than others; year 3, all partners are fully
operational; year 4, the program is being institutionalized and the state seeks out new partners for
funding; finally, in year 5, the state is almost completely weaned from federal support.  
To date, 47 states have received federal funding under the program.  In 1994, the first year
of program operation, a total of eight states received federal funding.  Many of these states are
currently trying to identify alternate funding sources to substitute for federal money.  Among the eight
first-wave states, Michigan has done by far the most.  Michigan has pledged to support STW with
the same level of funding as that devoted to vocational education.  
Employment Service
Ever since the UI system was established by the Social Security Act of 1935, there has been
a close relationship between UI and the United States Employment Service (ES).  The systems are
closely linked through ES administration of the UI work test (Balducchi, Johnson and Gritz, 1997).
The work test in UI is the requirement that UI beneficiaries be actively seeking work. 
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The ES in the United States is a federal-state system of public employment offices that serve
as a free public labor exchange for individuals seeking jobs and employers seeking workers.  The ES
was established by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933.  Federal money raised through employer payroll
taxes was used to transform an uneven collection of existing state ES offices in local areas into a
unified system having more consistent operating procedures nationwide.  The first aim of the new ES
was to handle the workload of referring participants to depression-era public works projects, the
Works Projects Administration (WPA) and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).  
The act was amended in 1982 to give more authority over the ES to state governors.  There
are now almost 1,800 local ES offices in 54 states and territories of the United States  Federal funding
for the ES has declined by nearly one-third over the past 20 years.  In most states, federal funding still
comprises the bulk of money for operating local offices; in others, state funding is the biggest share.
Through the Wagner-Peyser funding, the federal government bought influence into the state
employment exchange system.  The mission of the ES is bring job seekers and employers with job
vacancies together.  The main ES activities to meet this aim are the UI work test, job interview
referral, counseling, skill and aptitude testing, job development (soliciting job vacancy listings from
employers), job clubs, job search skills, job search workshops, and job fairs.  Wagner-Peyser Act
labor exchange services are delivered in three tiers: (1) self-service, (2) facilitated self-service, and
(3) staff-assisted service.  With continued federal restraint on funding, the ES, in an attempt to
maintain service within a limited budget has developed America’s Job Bank (AJB), which is an
Internet-based job-matching system to serve workers and employers (http://www.ajb.dni.us/).  
As the labor market in the United States matured, the share of all job seekers and employers
served by the ES gradually shrank to the point where clients consisted mainly of those most hard to
place in jobs (Jacobson, 1995).  A major renewal of the ES is now underway as a consequence of the
1994 Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system and the new Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) of 1998.  The ES is being reinvigorated by the WPRS system, which refers
to ES services those UI beneficiaries who are most likely to exhaust UI  (Eberts and O’Leary, 1997).
WPRS referrals to the ES are made early in the unemployment spell.  Some commentators have
claimed that the WPRS was motivated by the federal government’s desire for a balanced budget and
have noted the possible effects WPRS would have on conserving UI trust funds.  
The main complaint of states about the WPRS is that it was an unfunded mandate of the
federal government for he states: it added to the ES workload burden without adding revenues to
the system.  The WIA offers the prospect of further revival of the ES through the concept of one-
stop-shopping available at a single physical location.  The local ES office is an appealing site for such
a one-stop in most communities.  Furthermore, recent federal legislation for the WIA proposed by
the executive branch (the U.S. Department of Labor and the Office of the President) recommends a
sizeable increase in federal funding for all states and territories where the ES operates.  
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38Much of the material on occupational regulation in this paper is drawn from a research overview and plan
prepared by Kleiner and Young (1998).  
Factors Influencing the Geographic Mobility of Labor
There are no legal restrictions on the mobility of citizens in the United States to choose the
state or territory in which they reside.  Also, as mentioned above, the federal government has
arranged for states to coordinate services to provide for interstate unemployment insurance benefit
claims.  In theory such arrangements help to shorten unemployment duration by increasing the
number of labor markets in which unemployed job seekers may reasonably search.  However, in
practice there are other legal restrictions which prevent the completely free flow of skilled workers
across state borders.  Occupational regulation affects more than 18 percentof the U.S. workforce,
a larger percentage than either unions that claim membership (under 15 percent of the labor force)
or minimum wage laws, which on any given day determine wage rates for only about 5 percent of
workers (Kleiner, 1990; Card and Krueger, 1995, pp. 5-6).38 
Unlike in most industrialized countries, where the national government sets the rules on entry
and the right to continue practice, occupational regulation in the U.S. is mainly a purview of the
states.  Occupations may be regulated by any combination of licensure, certification, or registration.
Among these, licensing is the most restrictive form of control.  Prior to 1950, states licensed no more
than 50 occupations, which amounted to about 3 percent of the labor force (Shimbert, Esser, and
Kruger, 1973).  The growth in state licensing has mushroomed since then.  Licencing was limited
mainly to lawyers, dentists, physicians, and accountants in the first half of the 20th century.   Licensed
occupations remain concentrated in service occupations such as architecture, child care, chiropractic,
cosmetology, counseling, nursing, optometry, pharmacy, real estate brokerage, and social work.  The
Council on Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation (CLEAR 1994, p. iii) reports that “state and
provincial agencies oversee more than 800 professional and occupational categories.  In the United
States 25 professions are regulated in all 50 states.  A like number is regulated by almost all states;
the greatest percentage is regulated by fewer than half.”  Sub-state political divisions regulate several
other occupations.  
The stated aim of occupational and professional regulation is to guarantee minimum standards
are met by all licensed, certified, and registered practitioners so as to protect the health, welfare, and
safety of the populace (CLEAR 1994, p. iii).  Since the majority of occupational regulation in the
United States is done at the state level, the system also has he effect of impeding the free mobility
of labor services across state borders.  Some states grant licenses to practitioners licensed in certain
occupations in certain other states.  Such reciprocity arrangements vary by state and occupation.
They are sometimes based on the notion of common regional custom and respect for neighbors, and
sometimes are structured in hierarchical way with states sometimes endorsing licenses granted in
states having more stringent standards.  Frequently, an experienced licensed professional will be
permitted to practice in another state on a short-term temporary project.  Particularly appealing states
and those with high densities in certain occupations, such as Hawaii and California, have strong
restrictions on granting licenses to practitioners in other states.  Oftentimes states share common
standards for the right to sit for license examinations, such as academic training and work experience
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39Other nations are seriously considering some form of experience rating for UI taxes.  These nations include
the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain.  
requirements.  As a practical matter, license exams are difficult to pass several years after academic
training has been completed.  Considering all the occupational restrictions taken together, state-
regulated credential systems are significant barriers to the free flow of labor services within the United
States.  
V. Effects of Employment Programs
The Employment Act of 1946 made full employment and price stability official policy goals
of the federal government of the United States.  The intervening years have witnessed a variety of
federal initiatives to promote employment.  Nearly all of these efforts have been influenced by the
ideologies from the full political spectrum.  One common feature of most employment programs has
been provisions for program evaluation to identify whether funded activities are sufficiently cost
effective.  This is particularly true for training programs, but evaluation research has also greatly
shaped the evolution of unemployment insurance (UI) and youth employment programs.  
Effects of Unemployment Insurance
The federal-state unemployment insurance system acts as a built in stabilizer for the national
economy.  It injects spending through unemployed workers’ consumer purchases when the economy
is contracting, with the injections being reduced as the economy, expands and unemployment
declines.   As shown in Table 4, UI benefits constitute a non-negligible portion of total s endi g in
the economy with the total value hovering between one-quarter and three-quarters of one percent of
the nation’s gross domestic product since program inception.  However, Burtless (1991, p. 38) has
argued that “changes in the system over the past decade have eroded the value of unemployment
insurance both as income protection for the unemployed and as an automatic stabilizer.”  Bassi and
McMurrer (1998) attribute declining recipiency in recent years to be a consequence of interstate
competition for business location.  Wheaton (1983, p. 85) estimated that UI taxes are the second
most important factor influencing business location, but Vroman (1998) failed to find significant
impacts on employer decisions about the choice of state for operations. 
Experience rating of UI tax contributions is a feature unique to the United States.39  A claimed
benefit of experience rating is to encourage employers to dampen fluctuations in staffing levels.  Since
tax obligations rise for a firm as benefit charges increase, perfect experience rating would tend to
stabilize staffing, perhaps in part by lowing hiring rates.  However, because of tax minimums,
maximums, non-charged benefits, and other factors the systems do not operate perfectly (Tannenwald
and O’Leary, 1997).  Benefit charges for some employers are subsidized, and this partly defeats
employment stabilizing effects.  Feldstein (1978) estimated that a large share of temporary layoffs are
due to imperfect experience rating of UI taxes.  Topel (1984) found that even when experience rating
does operate properly there is in fact a substantial stabilizing influence on employment.  Card and
Levine (1994) found that the stabilizing influence of experience rating changes pro-cyclically, with
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associated UI tax subsidies explaining as much as 50 percent of temporary layoff employment during
recessions.  
Since the work of Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) it has been generally accepted in the United
States that UI lengthens spells of insured unemployment beyond what they would be otherwise.
Decker (1997) documented the range of estimates UI has on reemployment.  He reported that a 10
percent increase in the rate at which UI benefits replace prior wages increases the duration of
unemployment by between 0.5 and 1.5 weeks, and a one-week increase in the potential duration of
benefits increases unemployment duration by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks.  While these negative
impact estimates are not disputable, it is also possible that prolonged job search improves the quality
of job matches which ultimately boosts worker productivity.  
Effects of Training
The Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was the first federal attempt to
help reemploy displaced workers through job skill retraining.  The main concern was job loss due to
technological change (Leigh, 1990).  Between September 1962 and September 1967, 601,000 people
were enrolled in retraining programs organized by local areas which received federal grants directly
from regional offices of the U.S. Department of Labor.  At the time of the major evaluation, 74,000
were still involved in retraining programs and 30 percent had dropped out of training.  Among the
remainder, 90 percent obtained reemployment during the year after training, and 77 percent were
employed at the time of the last follow-up survey (Mangum 1968, p. 8).  These gross outcome
estimates are not reliable indicators of the program’s net impacts.  That is, how does participant’s
success differ from otherwise similar nonparticipants?  Many claim that positive outcomes were
attributable to the booming 1960s economy fueled by Vietnam war spending.  State and local political
entities were uncomfortable at having authority circumvented under MDTA with federal contracts
going directly to local service providers.  When enacted in 1962, another feature which welded the
political compromise was its temporary status.  Had sunset provisions not ended MDTA, in 1969,
states and localities would certainly have influenced the administrative structure of any
reauthorization.  
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 was the first training
program for which the U.S. Department of Labor developed a data base specifically intended for
program evaluation (Leigh 1990, p. 10).  It was called the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower
Survey (CLMS) and contained data on program participants, data on comparison group members
drawn from the national labor force survey (Current Population Survey), and earnings data for all
subjects from national social insurance (Social Security) records.  Despite the fact that CETA
programs were targeted to low-income individuals while the labor force survey represented the
nation, evaluation studies were greatly facilitated.  Three main findings emerged from 11 major CETA
evaluations (Leigh 1990, p. 11).  First, there were no measurable employment or earnings impacts
for men; however, impacts for women were positive and significant.  Second, on-the-job training is
usually more effective than classroom training.  Finally, the range of impact estimates was quite wide,
despite the fact that all n ysts used the same CLMS data.  However, it was journalists rather than
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40The analogy is to milk, where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off.
Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get reemployment
assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be otherwise.  Highly qualified program
entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even without the services offered in the program, while for less-
qualified applicants, the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.  
41An evaluation of retraining in Hungary found evidence of creaming in referral to services  (O’Leary, 1997).
economists who brought an end to CETA.  The pubic service employment (PSE) component of
CETA became a national target for criticism when careless management of funds and enrollment of
program ineligibles were widely reported.  The associated problem of “fiscal substitution,” where by
local government agencies replaced regular staff with CETA PSE workers in order to conserve local
taxpayer money, wasestimated by Johnson and Tomola (1977) to increase with the maturity of the
program.  Problems in CETA PSE increased dramatically after funding for PSE was greatly expanded
in 1977 as part of an expansionary federal fiscal policy.  The CETA program was not renewed in
1982, its scheduled expiration date (Leigh 1990, p. 7).  Even though states gained a role in
administration of CETA vis-a-vis MDTA, in the end no states were advocates for continued
authorization of CETA.  
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 was the result of true ideological and
partisan compromise.  The bill was jointly sponsored by the liberal Democratic Senator Edward
Kennedy and the conservative Republican Senator Daniel Quayle.  Many features of the bill reflected
the compromise.  Evaluation was an integral part of the program, which was said to be performance-
driven through a system of performance standards for participant reemployment rates and earnings.
Also of note was the absence of anything remotely resembling PSE.  The performance standards
system allowed governors receiving federal JTPA training grants to structure incentive systems,
thereby simplifying relationships with substate areas.  Ostensibly, they were able to remove politics
from the funding process.  Governors reserved some allocations for incentive rewards paid to areas
achieving high levels of performance.  The performance monitoring system changed training program
management and intergovernmental relations.  It also complicated the net impact evaluation of
programs by introducing the risk of creaming in program assignment.40  That is, program managers
might select mainly the most able applicants for participation.  The result would be high observed
reemployment rates; however, many of the selected program participants may already possess the
skills and abilities to get reemployed themselves.  By comparing their success to all unemployed, the
positive impact on reemployment is high, but comparing their success to others with similar
characteristics the program impacts may be much smaller.41  To assure an objective net impact
evaluation, Congress authorized a major national evaluation of JTPA based on methods of field
experimentation, with random assignment of subjects both to training and to compariso  gr ups in
16 sites across the country.  Orr et al. (1995, p. 109) reported that training to economically
disadvantaged a ults resulted in 11 percent greater earnings for women and 6.7 percent greater
earnings for men.  For both genders, the earnings gains were mainly due to increases in hours worked.
There were positive net benefits to both men and women, and the net benefit to society for both
genders was just over $500 per participant (Orr et al.1995, p. 89).  
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The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 created one-stop-shopping centers for
reemployment services.  Full implementation of the WIA through administrative regulations is
scheduled to begin in July of 2000.  It will be some time before the effectiveness of the new program
emphasis and delivery system can be assessed.  A significant feature of the WIA for local areas is the
increased private sector control over use of training funds.  Workforce Development Boards (WDBs)
are to have a significant majority membership from the employer community.  Targeting to the most
difficult to reemploy and follow-up monitoring of outcomes were retained from JTPA.  The new
emphasis of the WIA is on “work first”; in other words, a job is the best training.  If jobs are not
available, training will mostly be customized to serve employers needs, on-the-job training, and short-
term training in core skills.  Spending on university or college courses for the purpose of completing
degree requirements will generally not be funded under the WIA.  WIA will pass funds from the
federal government to state governors by a formula.  The governor will then allocatemoney to the
WDBs by a formula but will reserve 30 percent for discretionary projects and incentive payments to
areas for outstanding performance.  The administrative units for WDBs will select WIA activities
based on local labor demand and will award contracts after a bidding process.  Under the WIA, the
administrative unit for the WDB is prohibited from bidding for or delivering services under the WIA.
The state will monitor performance in workforce investment areas, and states will prepare summary
reports on monitoring to the federal government.  The regional ETA offices will monitor state
performance and compliance with federal law in managing WIA activities.
Effects of Programs for Youth
In the United States between 20 and 35 percent of secondary (grades 9 to 12) students pursue
a vocational track for their studies.  Evaluation studies have found that secondary vocational
education yields generally improved labor market outcomes for girls relative to girls not in the
vocational track; for boys, improved labor market success accrues only when employment is related
to the area of vocational training.  
To date there has been no evaluation of federally funded technical preparation programs for
youth.  The federal government is currently considering instituting a system of performance
monitoring to encourage positive outcomes for tech prep programs.  
It is too early to examine long-term net impacts of school-to-work (STW) programs, and
evaluations of short-term impacts have yielded mixed results.  Mathematica Policy Research, which
is conducting a national evaluation, has identified many excellent programs around the country;
however, STW services are not reaching as many students as planned.  Currently there is a well-
financed conservative political group working hard against STW.  They argue that there is too much
federal control and that career development does not belong in the schools.  The anti-STW lobby has
been very successful despite polls that show an overwhelming majority of parents believe that STW
is good and that career development belongs in schools.  The Republican-dominated Congress is
bowing to lobby pressure and has indicated that federal funding will be allowed to end in 2001.  
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42Balducchi, Johnson and Gritz (1997), citing evidence from Corson, Long and Nicholson (1984) and Johnson
and Klepinger (1994).  
43The Wagner-Peyser Act requires that “each state receiving funds under this Act shall (1) make such reports
concerning its operations and expenditures in such form and containing such information as shall be prescribed by the
Secretary [of Labor], and (2) establish and maintain a management system in accordance with guidelines established
by the Secretary.” (U.S. Congress 1998, p. 32564). 
44Corson et al. (1989 p. 118).
Effects of the Employment Service
The two main roles of the ES are to provide basic labor exchange services and to administer
the UI work test.  The only labor exchange function to receive rigorous evaluation is job interview
referrals, which have been found to be cost effective by several studies (Balducchi, Johnson and Gritz,
1997).  There are wide-ranging differences across the states in both the rules for the UI work test and
in the stringency of enforcement (Johnson et al., 1983).  Evidence from experimental evaluations of
the work test have found that “strong work test requirements are effective in reducing UI payments
and that weak work search and work test policies have large and adverse consequences for the UI
trust fund.”42 
States ubmit quarterly statistical reports to the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration, covering activities provided by the state administered public ES programs.
State reporting is a condition of federal Wagner-Peyser grants for the ES.43  A new system for
monitoring performance of ES delivery was developed by the Federal-State Labor Exchange
Performance Measures workgroup and set in place in 1998 (U.S. Congress, 1998).  Compliance was
required of the states by the federal government so that the United States ES could conform with the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.  GPRA was enacted “to improve the
confidence of the American people in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically
holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results” (U.S. Congress 1998, p. 32564).
Initial measurements under this new system are only now being taken.  Results have not yet been
published.  
Effects of Factors Influencing the Geographic Mobility of Labor
For policy-makers interested in promoting flexible labor markets that foster the most efficient
use of human resources in the economy, systems which permit the free flow of labor among
geographically separated labor markets are preferred to systems which hinder efficient job matching.
The federal-state system for unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States has developed
interstate UI benefit arrangements which support the free flow of labor. 
The UI system has also been the context for an experimental evaluation of worker geographic
mobility.  Cash relocation assistance was part of a treatment in the New Jersey UI reemployment
experiment conducted in 1985-86.  “The potential relocation assistance consisted of two components:
(1) payments for out-of-area job search if job interviews were prearranged and (2) payments for
moving expenses.”44  For employment prospects at least 50 miles away, job search expenses up to
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45See studies by Kulik, Smith and Stromsdorfer (1984) and by Corson et al. (1984).  
$400 and relocation costs of up to $1,000 were paid.  However, as found in earlier studies, the use
of available relocation assistance was minimal.45  The participation rate was less than 1 percent among
those offered assistance.  Therefore, while the UI system accommodates those with a desire to
relocate across state borders, it is unlikely that any new federal legislation will permit additional cash
payments beyond UI weekly benefits to support relocation.  
Many years ago, Friedman and Kuznets (1945) found that occupational regulation of
physicians by states drives up prices paid by consumers and has a potentially negative impact on the
quality of services.  Most recent research on occupational regulation has been consistent with these
findings (Kleiner and Young, 1998).  For physicians, Leffler (1978) found sizeable income gains due
to regulated training and licensure.  Rottenberg (1980) reported that television repair prices are higher
in states requiring licensure.  Bond et al. (1980) found eye exam and eyeglass prescriptions to be
significantly more expensive in cities with restrictive laws regulating optometrists.  However,
licensure appears not to have had measurable affects on earnings of either school teachers (Kleiner
and Petree, 1988) or laboratory technologists (White, 1978), and licensing has not affected the supply
of barbers (Thornton and Weintraub, 1979).  Most research has found no effect of licensure on the
quality of outputs; these studies include Carrol and Gaston (1981) on electricians, dentists, and
plumbers; Kleiner and Petree (1988) on teachers, and Kleiner and Kudrle (1997) on dentists.  Holen
(1978) did find evidence that licensure improves the quality of dental care.   
Kleiner, Gay and Greene (1982) investigated whether occupational licensing creates
significant barriers to labor migration.  They attempted to compare migration under the current
arrangement of state occupational licensure with one wherein a license granted in any state entitles
practice in all states.  The alternative is equivalent to national licensure as practiced in most developed
industrialized countries.  Their model estimated for 14 occupations showed “that more restrictive
state licencing statues reduced immigration [to a state] and were significantly related to increases in
earnings of the persons in these occupations”  (Kleiner, Gay and Greene 1982, p. 383). 
Occupational licensure, certification, and registration affects more than 18 percent of the U.S.
workforce.  Since the majority of occupational regulation in the United States is done at the state
level, the system has the effect of impeding the free mobility of labor services across state borders.
 
VI. Conclusion
 
Labor market support policy in the United States has been shaped by efforts of the federal
government.  These initiatives usually have been forged in difficult economic times with contributions
and compromise from the full political spectrum.  States have oftentimes independently considered
labor market support programs, but usually have failed to act for fear of competitively disadvantaging
resident industries.  Constitutional authority to raise revenue and control commerce among the states
permitted a federal umbrella for the establishment and maintenance of a variety of labor market
support programs which are now delivered in states and local areas.  The interplay of federal, state,
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and local partners in labor market policy has resulted in a system which varies greatly at the local and
state level but maintains important federal standards nationwide.
The first federal employment laws supporting the labor market were enacted with consensus
across party lines during the desperate days of the Great Depression.  In 1933, the U.S. Employment
Service was established through federal funding, which introduced vigor and consistency to existing
loose state and local structures.  In 1935, the Social Security Act established the federal-state system
for unemployment insurance (UI) through a clever tax offset scheme which proved to be a legal
federal ever for state action.  In 1962, the federal Manpower Development and Training Act
established the first of four major retraining initiatives targeted to the disadvantaged and structurally
unemployed.  Other federal initiatives have supported state and local programs to promote labor
market success for youth.  In each and every case, economic conditions built a political consensus for
action; with independent state efforts insufficient, federal intervention provided for state and local
delivery of services which could be customized to local needs.  
Intergovernmental relations among federal, state, and local partners in employment policy
have not always operated smooth and amicably.  Tensions, experience, and compromise also
contributed to the existing employment policy landscape.  Federal budget considerations in the 1980s
greatly influenced many aspects of the federal-state UI system.  Local and state experience with
training and youth programs and federal political sentiments toward cash public assistance payments
have reshaped rules and incentives in these programs.  In many real ways the states have been
laboratories for investigating program innovation; this too has shaped programs.
As programs have evolved through the twentieth century, a network of labor market support
has been established through federal initiative.  Without leadership from the federal partner, such a
support system for workers and employers would likely not exist.  However, without the creativity,
occasional resistance, and ingenuity of the states and local partners, the system could not possibly
have achieved the same rich level of adaptation to the diverse needs of labor market participants.  
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Appendix A
Excerpts from the Constitution for 
the United States of America
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The following excerpts from the Constitution for the United States of America pertain to
federal-state r lations.  Intergovernmental relations concerning labor and employment policy have
been shaped by constitutional provisions regarding federal government authority to raise revenue and
regulate commerce.  Material in this appendix is taken from the World Wide Web site of the United
States House of Representatives (www.house.gov).
Preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America. 
Article. I.
Section. 8. 
Clause 1: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
Clause 3: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes; 
Section. 9. 
Clause 1: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person. 
Article. III. 
Section. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
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Section. 2. 
Clause 1: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another
State; (See Note 10)—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
Historical Notes:
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, an Articles of Confederation, drafted by the
Continental Congress and approved by 13 states, provided for a union of the former British colonies.
Even before Maryland became the last state to accede to the Articles in 1781, a number of Americans,
particularly those involved in the prosecution of the Revolutionary War, recognized the inadequacies
of the Articles as a national government. In the 1780s, these nationally minded Americans became
increasingly disturbed by the Articles’ failure to provide the central government with authority to raise
revenue, regulate commerce, or enforce treaties.
The Delegates who convened at the Federal Conv ntion on May 25, 1787, quickly rejected
the idea of revising the Articles of Confederation and agreed to construct a new framework for a
national government. Throughout the summer months at the Convention in Philadelphia, delegates
from 12 states debated the proper form such a government should take, but few questioned the need
to establish a more vigorous government to preside over the union of states. The 39 delegates who
signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787, expected the new charter to provide a permanent
guarantee of the political liberties achieved in the Revolution.
Amendments to the Constitution
Article XIII. 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
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Proposal and Ratification 
The thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed to the legislatures
of the several states by the Thirty-eighth Congress, on the 31st day of January, 1865, and was
declared, in a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated the 18th of December, 1865, to have been
ratified by the legislatures of 27 of the 36 states.
Article XIV. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article. 
Proposal and Ratification 
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States was proposed to the legislatures
of the several states by the Thirty-ninth Congress, on the 13th of June, 1866. It was declared, in a
certificate of the Secretary of State dated July 28, 1868, to have been ratified by the legislatures of
28 of the 37 States.
Article XV. 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
Proposal and Ratification 
The fifteenth amendment to the C nstitution of the United States was proposed to the legislatures
of the several states by the Fortieth Congress, on the 26th of February, 1869, and was declared, in
a proclamation of the Secretary of State, dated March 30, 1870, to have been ratified by the
legislatures of 29 of the 37 states. 
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Appendix B
A Chronology of Federal Laws
Concerning Employment Policy
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46This list was compiled from information provided by Fallis (1991) and Jackson (1986).  
A Chronology of Federal Laws concerning Employment Policy46
1862 The Morrill Act granted land from the federal government to the states to establish public
institutions of higher learning.
1917 The Smith-Hughes Act prescribed a federal role for vocational education.
1931 The Davis-Bacon Act regulates the rate of wages for laborers and mechanics employed in the
construction f public buildings for the federal government by contractors and subcontractors,
where the public expenditure totals $2,000 or more.  
1932 The Norris-LaGuardia Act further restricted judiciary power to prevent unions from engaging
in strikes, picketing, and boycotts. 
1933 The Wagner-Peyser Act established the federal-state Employment Service (ES) system.
1935 The Social Security Act (Titles III and IX) established the federal-state system for
unemployment insurance (UI).
1935 The Wagner Act (also known as the National Labor Relations Act) further extended
privileges of unions and created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) t  dminister
and enforce provisions of the act.
1936 Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act established employment standards for contractors
furnishing or manufacturing materials, articles, or equipment for the U.S. government.  
1938 Fair Labor Standards Act set general standards for minimum wages, overtime compensation,
equal pay, and child labor.
1946 The Employment Act set a national goal of providing an economic environment that would
ensure job opportunities for a persons able, available, and actively seeking work.  It also
focused government funded job search assistance to returning World War II veterans and
established the president's council of economic advisers.  
1947 The Taft-Hartley Act, also called the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), refined the
collective bargaining environment by somewhat limiting union rights and guaranteeing certain
freedoms of speech and conduct to employers and to non-union employees.
1947 The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act relieved employers from unforseen liabilities.
35
1954 The Reed Act provided that when the reserves in the federal UI administration and loan
accounts exceeds a certain threshold level, the xcess be returned to the states.  States may
use Reed Act money to finance either regular UI benefits or administrative costs.  
1958 The National Defense Education Act promoted higher education in science and engineering
to boost the national defense in response to the Soviet Sputnik launch.
1962 The Manpower Development and Training Act originally targeted workers dislocated by
technical innovation, the youth component was expanded in 1963, and targeting of
structurally unemployed was increased in 1965.
1962 The Trade Expansion Act created Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA).  TAA was
recompense to workers and business hurt by reductions in international trade barriers.  
1962 The Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act was passed to supercede the collection
of statutes that became law from 1892 to 917, which together became known as the Eight
Hour Laws.  The new act regulated payment of overtime wages for all laborers and mechanics
employed on any public works project financed with government funds.  
1963 The Equal Pay Act was designed to eliminate wage differentials based on gender.  
1964 The Economic Opportunity Act set up the federal Office of Economic Opportunity to address
poverty problems.
1965 McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act addresses wages and hours under contracts with
the federal government to provide services.  
1970 Extended Unemployment Compensation Act created a permanent program whereby the
federal government would pay for extended unemployment compensation benefits in tates
and areas where the insured unemployment rate exceeded preset threshold levels.  
1971 The Emergency Employment Act intended to create public service employment (PSE) jobs
to combat record levels of unemployment.
1973 The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) consolidated several programs
under the Office of Economic Opportunity.  CETA decentralized and decategorized
management and funding following MDTA. 
1982 The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) focused job skill training to needy, welfare
recipients, dislocated workers, and youth.  To retain contracts prime sponsors from CETA
were required to add a tri-partite advisory board called a private industry council (PIC).
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1993 The unemployment compensation amendments of 1993 (Public Law 103-152) revised
extended benefit rules and required states to implement a system to identify UI claimants most
likely to need job search assistance to avoid long-term unemployment.  This system for
identification became known as the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS)
system.  It strengthened the ties between UI and the public employment service.  
1993 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act (Public Law
103-182) gave states the option of continuing UC benefits for claimants who elect to start
their own businesses.  Authorization was set to expire in December 1998.  Permanent
authorization was granted by federal legislation in 1998 for states to provide self-employment
assistance with UI trust fund money.
1998 The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) created physical one-stop-shopping centers for
reemployment services and UI benefits.  The PICs of JTPA were replaced with workforce
development boards having a majority membership from the private business community.
Delivery of training, with targeting to the most difficult to reemploy, and follow-up
monitoring of outcomes were all retained from JTPA.  
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Table 1.  1997 Employment Data: United States and States
Unemployment Rate (%)          Labor Force Participation Rate (%)
Total Black Youth
Long-term
(27 weeks or more) Total Male Female
United States 4.9 10.0 16.0 15.8 67.1 77.0 60.5
Alabama 5.1 10.8 18.4 13.4 65.1 72.7 58.1
Alaska            7.9   7.6   20.9   13.5 74.2 80.4 67.9
Arizona            4.6   8.7   14.4   9.3 63.8 72.6 55.3
Arkansas           5.3   13.7   18.9   13.4 63.1 69.9 56.9
California          6.3   11.8   20.6   19.1 66.2 75.2 57.6
Colorado           3.3   6.9   14.1   9.0 72.8 78.8 66.8
Connecticut       5.1   10.6   14.9   16.8 68.3 73.9 63.2
Delaware           4.0   6.7   15.1   19.2 67.3 72.2 62.8
District of Columbia         7.9 11.4   42.4   30.7 61.8 66.5 57.8
Florida            4.8   9.4   13.9   12.0 62.3 69.8 55.4
Georgia            4.5   8.3   17.3   12.4 69.3 77.9 61.6
Hawaii            6.4     NA 19.0   23.9 67.8 72.8 63.4
Idaho             5.3    NA 13.3   7.7 70.6 77.8 63.3
Illinois           4.7   11.6   14.1   16.5 68.5 77.0 60.7
Indiana            3.5   9.7   10.7   8.5 69.3 78.0 61.2
Iowa             3.3   NA 12.7    NA 72.7 78.6 67.2
Kansas            3.8   NA 13.5   11.6 70.5 77.6 63.9
Kentucky          5.4   8.8   18.4   13.4 63.9 70.7 57.7
Louisiana          6.1   11.5   19.5   19.4 62.1 69.5 55.5
Maine             5.4   NA 15.0   20.0 67.8 73.5 62.3
Maryland          5.1   10.0   18.5   19.3 71.3 77.0 66.0
Massachusetts  4.0   10.0   12.6   16.1 69.0 75.5 62.9
Michigan           4.2   8.6   11.9   12.7 66.8 74.6 59.6
Minnesota        3.3   NA 10.4   13.1 74.5 81.1 67.9
Mississippi        5.7   11.4   18.8   17.6 62.0 68.7 55.9
Missouri           4.2   9.3   16.1   15.3 70.9 77.4 65.0
Montana          5.4   NA 17.3   14.0 67.3 72.8 61.9
Nebraska          2.6   NA 9.3   NA 73.3 80.8 66.3
Nevada            4.1   8.5   9.2   11.2 69.5 77.1 61.9
New Hampshire  3.1   NA 11.5   NA 71.8 79.0 64.9
New Jersey       5.1   9.4   15.0   19.8 67.7 76.7 59.7
New Mexico      6.2   NA 22.4   14.6 63.6 70.9 56.5
New York           6.4   13.4   21.3   26.3 63.1 71.8 55.5
North Carolina 3.6   6.8   12.8   12.6 68.6 75.8 61.9
North Dakota   2.5   NA 7.1   NA 72.6 78.4 67.0
Ohio             4.6   8.3   15.8   15.0 66.8 74.0 60.2
Oklahoma        4.1   8.8   14.2   12.7 64.2 73.2 56.2
Oregon            5.8   NA 17.2   8.5 68.6 76.4 60.9
Pennsylvania    5.2   12.1   16.7   15.8 64.5 73.1 56.9
Rhode Island    5.3   11.0   13.3   13.8 67.0 74.3 60.6
South Carolina 4.5   8.8   18.7   15.6 66.6 74.7 59.6
South Dakota   3.1   NA 8.3   NA 71.4 77.9 65.4
Tennessee        5.4   8.5   18.0   10.8 65.1 71.7 59.1
Texas             5.4   9.1   21.0   13.7 68.9 78.3 60.1
Utah             3.1   NA 9.2   NA 71.7 81.5 62.5
Vermont          4.0   NA 13.4   10.9 71.6 77.0 66.6
Virginia           4.0   8.7   11.4   13.9 66.8 73.5 60.7
Washington      4.8   NA 15.8   9.6 70.2 78.4 62.1
West Virginia   6.9   22.4   27.3   22.0 55.5 64.1 47.8
Wisconsin        3.7   15.7   10.6   8.0 74.7 79.8 69.7
Wyoming         5.1   NA 18.1   10.2 69.0 76.2 62.0
Sources:
U.S. Data.  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Labor Force Statistics from the Current  Population Survey [Online].  Available:
http//stats.bls.gove.80/cpshome.htm [1999, January 29].
State data.  U.S. Department of Labor.  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Geographic Profile of Employment and  Unemployment, 1997 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1998).  Tables 12 and 22.
Note: NA = data not available.
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Table 2.  Historical Employment Data: United States
Unemployment Rate (%) Total Labor Force Participation Rate (%)
Year Total Black Youth
Long-term
(27 weeks or more) Total Male Female
Civilian Labor
Force 
(In thousands)
1998 4.5 8.9 14.6 14.1 67.1 76.8 60.4 137,673
1997 4.9 10.0 16.0 15.8 67.1 77.0 60.5 136,297
1996 5.4 10.5 16.7 17.4 66.8 76.8 59.9 133,943
1995 5.6 10.4 17.3 17.3 66.6 76.7 59.4 132,304
1994 6.1 11.5 17.6 20.3 66.6 76.8 59.3 131,056
1993 6.9 13.0 19.0 20.1 66.3 77.3 58.5 129,200
1992 7.5 14.2 20.1 20.3 66.4 77.7 58.5 128,105
1991 6.8 12.5 18.7 12.9 66.2 77.7 57.9 126,346
1990 5.6 11.4 15.5 10.0 66.5 78.2 58.0 125,840
1989 5.3 11.4 15.0 9.9 66.5 78.1 57.7 123,869
1988 5.5 11.7 15.3 12.1 65.9 77.9 56.8 121,669
1987 6.2 13.0 16.9 14.0 65.6 78.0 56.2 119,865
1986 7.0 14.5 18.3 14.4 65.3 78.1 55.5 117,834
1985 7.2 15.1 18.6 15.4 64.8 78.1 54.7 115,461
1984 7.5 15.9 18.9 19.1 64.4 78.3 53.7 113,544
1983 9.6 19.5 22.4 23.9 64.0 78.5 53.1 111,550
1982 9.7 18.9 23.2 16.6 64.0 78.7 52.7 110,204
1981 7.6 15.6 19.6 14.0 63.9 79.0 52.1 108,670
1980 7.1 14.3 17.8 10.7 63.8 79.4 51.3 106,940
1979 5.8 12.3 16.1 8.7 63.7 79.8 50.6 104,962
1978 6.1 12.8 16.4 10.5 63.2 79.8 49.6 102,251
1977 7.1 14.0 17.8 14.7 62.3 79.7 48.1 99,009
1976 7.7 14.0 19.0 18.2 61.6 79.8 47.0 96,158
1975 8.5 14.8 19.9 15.2 61.2 80.3 46.0 93,775
1974 5.6 10.5 16.0 7.4 61.3 81.0 45.3 91,949
1973 4.9 9.4 14.5 7.9 60.8 81.3 44.4 89,429
1972 5.6 10.4 16.2 11.6 60.4 81.6 43.7 87,034
1971 5.9 NA 16.9 10.4 60.2 82.1 43.3 84,382
1970 4.9 NA 15.3 5.8 60.4 82.6 43.3 82,77l
1969 3.5 NA 12.2 4.7 60.1 82.8 42.7 80,734
1968 3.6 NA 12.7 5.5 59.6 83.1 41.6 78,737
1967 3.8 NA 12.9 5.9 59.6 83.4 41.1 77,347
1966 3.8 NA 12.8 8.3 59.2 83.6 40.1 75,770
1965 4.5 NA 14.8 10.4 58.9 83.9 39.4 74,455
1964 5.2 NA 16.2 12.7 58.7 84.2 38.9 73,091
1963 5.7 NA 17.2 13.6 58.7 84.4 38.3 71,833
1962 5.5 NA 14.7 15.0 58.8 84.8 37.8 70,614
1961 6.7 NA 16.8 17.1 59.3 85.7 38.0 70,459
1960 5.5 NA 14.7 11.8 59.4 86.0 37.6 69,628
1959 5.5 NA 14.6 15.3 59.3 86.3 37.1 68,369
1958 6.8 NA 15.9 14.5 59.5 86.6 36.9 67,639
1957 4.3 NA 11.6 8.4 59.6 86.9 36.5 66,929
1956 4.1 NA 11.1 8.4 60.0 87.6 36.4 66,552
1955 4.4 NA 11.0 11.8 59.3 87.6 35.4 65,023
1954 5.5 NA 12.6 9.0 58.8 87.8 34.2 63,643
1953 2.9 NA 7.6 4.3 58.9 88.0 33.9 63,015
1952 3.0 NA 8.5 4.5 59.0 88.3 34.1 62,138
1951 3.3 NA 8.2 6.7 59.2 88.2 34.0 62,017
1950 5.3 NA 12.2 10.9 59.2 88.4 33.3 62,208
1949 5.9 NA 13.4 7.0 58.9 88.5 32.3 61,286
1948 3.8 NA 9.2 5.1 58.8 88.6 31.8 60,621
1947 3.9 NA NA NA 58.3 NA NA 59,350
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey [Online]. 
Available: http://stats.bls.gov:80/cpshome.htm [1999, January 29].
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Table 3.  1997 Unemployment Insurance Data: United States and States
Average Weekly
Benefit Amount
for UI ($)
(1)
Ratio of Average
Weekly Benefit Amount
for UI to Average
Weekly Total Wage 
(2)
Duration of UI (weeks) Percentage of:
Average
Potential
(3)
Average Actual
(4)
Unemployed
Receiving UI
Benefits 
(5)
Population receiving
social assistance, 1996
(6)
Population below
the Poverty Line
(7)
Wage & Salary
Workers who are
Union members
(8)
United States 192.76 0.335 23.9 14.6 34.5 7.2 13.3 14.1
Alabama 144.67 0.294 24.2 10.2 27.4 6.3 15.7 10.2
Alaska 175.76 0.282 20.5 14.7 48.4 7.2 8.8 20.0
Arizona 146.52 0.279 23.4 14.0 208 5.6 17.2 7.0
Arkansas 198.24 0.449 23.8 12.1 44.1 6.1 19.7 5.9
California 151.85 0.239 24.9 16.5 38.4 11.5 16.6 16.0
Colorado 212-73 0.372 22.7 12.3 27.0 4.1 8.2 9.6
Connecticut 211.37 0.284 26.0 15.4 38.6 6.4 8.6 16.9
Delaware 193.70 0.314 25.5 15.6 40.8 4.8 9.6 11.7
D.C. 233.48 0.287 25.6 20.2 40.8 16.8 21.8 13.6
Florida 191.94 0.381 20.3 13.8 23.5 6.3 14.3 6.8
Georgia 162.47 0.292 21.2 9.3 20.9 7.5 14.5 7.1
Hawaii 268.83 0.506 26.0 17.0 35.3 7.3 13.9 26.3
Idaho 187.20 0.411 20.4 11.9 37.3 3.4 14.7 8.5
Illinois 217.41 0.344 26.0 16.9 40.1 7.8 11.2 18.5
Indian. 185.90 0.352 20.6 11.2 28.8 4.1 8.8 14.6
lowa. 205.03 0.433 22.6 11.8 37.3 4.6 9.6 13.2
Kansas 204.41 0.427 22.8 13.5 27.0 4.1 9.7 7.8
Kentucky 175.91 0.361 26.0 11.4 26.0 8.9 15.9 12.2
Louisiana 132.61 0.271 26.0 15.0 19.1 9.6 16.3 7.0
Maine 151.75 0.322 19.7 16.7 35.7 6.8 10.1 13.5
Maryland 195.93 0.332 26.0 15.7 26.6 5.7 8.4 14.9
Massachusetts 26L85 0.384 27.6 16.3 48.4 6.6 12.2 15.1
Michigan 221.75 0.352 21.6 11.8 42.6 7.6 10.3 23.1
Minnesota 242.00 0.418 23:3 14.6 39.5 5.1 9.6 19.9
Mississippi 14L24 0.330 23.5 13.5 27-3 10.0 16.7 5.4
Missouri 154.21 0.292 22.3 I27 33.5 6.5 11.8 14.6
Montana 166.09 0.404 20.9 14.2 36.2 5.2 15.6 13.8
Nebraska 16L81 0.348 2LI 11.9 29.8 3.7 9.8 9.3
Nevada 203.88 0.372 23.2 13.5 48-5 3.7 11.0 19.1
New Hampshire 165.26 0.295 26.0 10.8 24.1 3.0 9.1 10.2
New Jersey 258.50 0.360 23.2 16.6 44.7 5.4 9.3 22.0
New Mexico 158.00 0.343 25.8 15.8 23.3 8.6 21.2 8.4
New York 203.78 0.275 26.0 18.2 33.5 9.9 16.5 26.3
North Carolina 198.27 0.389 23.7 9.7 34.4 6.5 11.4 3.8
North Dakota 176.11 0.422 20.9 10.6 46.7 3.6 13.6 8.6
Ohio 207.99 0.375 25.6 13.3 28.9 7.2 11.0 18.9
Oklahoma 176.78 0.387 21.4 12.9 18.9 5.5 13.7 8.4
Oregon 198.14 0.366 25.1 14.7 40.8 4.2 11.6 17.6
Pennsylvania 227.50 0.395 25.9 16.0 47.1 6-8 11.2 17.1
Rhode Island 223.63 0.411 21.3 14.0 58.3 8.5 12.7 18.7
South Carolina 168.62 0.354 23.1 11.3 29.1 6.2 13.1 3.7
South Dakota 155.68 0.382 24.8 10.6 20.0 4.1 16.5 6.9
Tennessee 163.31 0.317 21.9 11.6 29.5 8.3 14.3 8.6
Texas 195.87 0.346 21.0 15.1 21.6 5.7 16.7 6.4
Utah 193.08 0.396 20.9 11.2 26.6 3.0 8.9 8.3
Vermont 173.52 0.358 26.0 14.2 51.1 6.5 9.3 8.5
Virginia 179.20 0.325 21.5 10.2 18.3 4.4 12.7 6.5
Washington 239.82 0.410 26.0 16.8 51.3 6.7 9.2 20.5
West Virginia 180.20 0.387 26.0 13.8 30.6 9.1 16.4 15.6
Wisconsin 188.47 0.360 24.7 13.6 48.8 5.1 8.2 18.8
Wyoming 181.80 0.410 21.7 14.0 26.3 3.9 13.5  9.3
(5) Taxable and reimbursable claims data (average number of weekly insured unemployed) as a proportion of the total number of unemployed.  In the 1950s an unemployment insurance program for ex-
military and ex-federal employees began. The taxable and reimbursable claims data does not include ex-military and ex-federal employees, while the total number of unemployed does include
these ex-workers.
(6) Total AFDC (average monthly number of recipients) plus SSI state data (number of persons receiving federally administered payments) as a proportion of total resident population.
Sources: 
(1-5)  U.S. Department of Labor. Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET H ndbook 394, 1997.
(5)     U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  State and Regional Unemployment, 1998 Annual Averages (news release) [Online]. Available: http://stats.bls.gov/newsre s.htm [1999, February
10]
(6)     U.S. Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation. AFDC time trends [Online]. Available: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/director.htm [1999
February 8].
         U.S. Social Security Administration.  Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 1997, Table 7.B1.
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. 118th ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), Table no. 26.
(7)     U.S.  Bureau of the Census.  Historical Poverty Tables [Online].  Available: http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov19.html [1999, February 2].
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Table 4.  Historical Unemployment Insurance Data: United States
Year
Average Weekly
Benefit Amount
 for UI ($)
(1)
Ratio Average Weekly
Benefit Amount for UI
to Average Weekly
Total Wage
(2)
Duration of UI (weeks) Percentage of:
UI Spending as a 
Fraction of GDP
(9)
Spending on All
Labor Market
Policy as a Fraction 
of GDP
(10)
Average Potential
(3)
Average Actual
(4)
Unemployed
Receiving UI
Benefits
(5)
Population
Receiving Social
Assistance
(6)
Population below
the Poverty Line
(7)
Wage & Salary
Workers who are
Union Members
(8)
1997 192.76 0.335 23.9 14.6 34.5 NA 13.3 14.1 0.26 0.35
1996 189.45 0.345 24.0 14.9 35.9 7.19 13.7 14.5 0.30 0.40
1995 187.29 0.355 24.0 14.7 34.8 7.61 13.8 14.9 0.31 0.42
1994 182.17 0.357 23.7 15.5 33.4 7.80 14.5 15.5 0.35 0.47
1993 179.62 0.360 23.9 15.9 30.8 7.72 15.1 15.8 0.54 0.66
1992 173.64 0.354 23.7 16.2 33.8 7.44 14.8 15.8 0.65 0.77
1991 169.88 0.364 23.9 15.4 38.7 6.94 14.2 16.1 0.46 0.58
1990 161.56 0.360 24.1 13.4 35.8 6.44 13.5 16.1 0.32 0.44
1989 151.73 0.354 24.2 13.2 33.1 6.21 12.8 16.4 0.27 0.39
1988 144.97 0.349 24.1 13.7 31.0 6.21 13.0 16.8 0.27 0.39
1987 140.55 0.355 23.7 14.6 31.0 6.29 13.4 17.0 0.32 0.44
1986 135.65 0.358 23.9 14.5 32.1 NA 13.6 17.5 0.39 0.53
1985 128.14 0.353 24.1 14.2 31.5 NA 14.0 18.0 0.39 0.52
1984 123.47 0.372 23.7 17.5 29.0 NA 15.2 18.8 0.42 0.56
1983 123.59 0.355 24.1 14.4 31.7 NA 14.4 20.1 0.76 0.94
1982 119.34 0.377 24.3 15.9 38.0 NA 15.0 NA 0.79 0.98
1981 106.61 0.359 24.2 14.4 36.8 NA 14.0 21.4 0.54 0.86
1980 99.66 0.366 24.3 14.9 43.9 NA 13.0 23.0 0.68 1.08
1979 89.68 0.360 24.2 13.1 39.5 NA 11.7 24.1 0.39 0.84
1978 83.67 0.364 24.5 13.3 38.0 NA 11.4 23.0 0.43 0.94
1977 78.79 0.364 24.1 14.2 37.9 NA 11.6 23.8 0.67 1.04
1976 75.16 0.371 24.0 14.9 40.4 NA 11.8 22.1 0.95 1.33
1975 70.23 0.371 24.3 15.7 50.1 NA 12.3 22.2 1.17 1.44
1974 64.34 0.366 2.4 12.6 43.8 NA 11.2 23.6 0.49 0.71
1973 59.00 0.361 24.3 13.4 37.3 NA 11.1 24.0 0.35 0.62
1972 56.68 0.367 24.3 14.2 37.9 NA 11.9 NA 0.51 0.77
1971 54.35 0.364 24.5 14.4 43.2 NA 12.5 NA 0.56 0.76
1970 50.31 0.357 24.6 12.3 44.1 NA 12.6 NA 0.41 0.58
1969 46.17 0.344 24.4 11.4 38.9 NA 12.1 NA 0.24 0.42
1968 43.43 0.343 24.3 11.6 39.4 NA 12.8 NA 0.25 0.44
1967 41.25 0.347 24.5 11.4 40.4 NA 14.2 NA 0.27 0.43
1966 39.76 0.347 24.2 11.2 36.9 NA 14.7 NA 0.25 0.39
1965 37.19 0.338 24.1 12.2 39.4 NA 17.3 NA 0.33 0.42
1964 35.96 0.338 24.2 13.0 42.3 NA 19.0 NA 0.42 0.47
1963 35.28 0.346 24.1 13.3 44.0 NA 19.5 NA 0.49 0.54
1962 34.56 0.349 23.9 13.1 45.5 NA 21.0 NA 0.53 0.58
1961 33.80 0.354 23.9 14.7 48.5 NA 21.9 NA 0.78 NA
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Table 4 (continued)
Year
Average Weekly
Benefit Amount for
UI ($)
(1)
Ratio Average Weekly
Benefit Amount for UI
to Average Weekly
Total Wage
(2)
Duration of UI (weeks) Percentage of:
UI Spending as a
 Fraction of
GDP
(9)
Spending on All
Labor Market
Policy as a Fraction
 of GDP
(10)
Average Potential
(3)
Average Actual
(4)
Unemployed
Receiving UI
Benefits
(5)
Population
Receiving Social
Assistance
(6)
Population below
the Poverty Line
(7)
Wage & Salary
Workers who are
Union Members
(8)
1960 32.87 0.352 24.0 12.7 49.4 NA 22.2 NA 0.55 NA
1959 30.40 0.353 23.6 14.8 44.5 NA 22.4 NA 0.53 NA
1958 30.54 0.334 23.5 13.1 54.6 NA NA NA 0.88 NA
1957 28.17 0.335 23.4 11.5 50.6 NA NA NA 0.40 NA
1956 27.02 0.333 23.0 11.4 44.1 NA NA NA 0.34 NA
1955 25.04 0.321 22.7 12.4 44.0 NA NA NA 0.37 NA
1954 24.93 0.335 22.4 12.8 52.8 NA NA NA 0.56 NA
1953 23.58 0.323 22.1 10.1 54.2 NA NA NA 0.27 NA
1952 22.79 0.330 22.0 10.4 54.4 NA NA NA 0.29 NA
1951 21.09 0.322 21.4 10.1 7.2 NA NA NA 0.26 NA
1950 20.76 0.344 21.1 13.0 45.7 NA NA NA 0.50 NA
1949 20.48 0.360 21.4 11.8 54.3 NA NA NA 0.64 NA
1948 19.03 0.341 21.1 10.7 44.0 NA NA NA 0.31 NA
1947 17.83 0.346 19.5 11.1 43.6 NA NA NA 0.32 NA
Notes:
(5)  Taxable and reimbursable claims data (average number of weekly insured unemployed) as a proportion of the total number of unemployed.  In the 1950s an unemployment insurance program for ex-military and ex-federal employees
began. The taxable and reimbursable claims data does not include ex-military and ex-federal employees, while the total number of unemployed does include these ex-workers.
(6)  Total AFDC (average monthly number of recipients) plus SSI summary data (number of persons receiving federally administered payments) as a proportion of total resident population.
(9)  Benefits paid in the unemployment insurance programs (includes all regular and extended programs, as well as programs for ex-federal and ex-military, temporary/emergency enactments) as a proportion of the GDP.
(10) Federal outlays for labor market policies include training and employment programs, other labor services, and unemployment compensation as a proportion of GDP.
Sources:
(1-5)  U.S. Department of Labor. Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET H ndbook 394 [Online]. Available:  http://www.itsc.state.md.us/prog_info/ET/et394toc.html [1999, Februrary 2].
(5)  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey [Online]. Available: http://stats.bls.gov:80/cpshome.htm [1999, February 10].
(6)  U.S. Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation.  AFDC time trends [Online].  Available: http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/director.htm [1999 February 8].
       U.S. Social Security Administration.  Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 1997, Table 7.B. 
       Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988. 118th ed. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), Table no. 2.
(7)   Joseph Dalaker and Mary Naifeh.  Poverty in the United States: 1997. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports P60-201), Table C-1.
(8) Barry T.  Hirsch and David A.  Macpherson.  Union Membership and Earnings Data Book: Compilations From the Current Population Survey (Washi gton, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1998), p.  11.
(9-10) U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Office.  Table provided by Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, February 11, 1999.
        U.S. Office of Management and Budget.  t of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2000, Historical Tables (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999).  Table 10.1.
(10)  U.S. Office of Management and Budget.  et of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2000, Historical Tables (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999).  Table 3.2.
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Table 5. A Chronology of Increasing Federal Conformity Requirements for State
Unemployment Insurance Systems in the United States
Original conformity requirements set in 1935 were minimal, saying states must:
Make full payment of benefits when due
Make benefit payments through public employment offices 
Have a fair appeals hearing process
Transfer tax receipts immediately to the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) in Washington
Use withdrawals from the state account in the UTF only to pay UI benefits
Make required reports to the U.S. Secretary of Labor
Provide information to any federal agency running public works or assistance
Not deny benefits to eligible individuals
Not pay benefits until 2 years after contributions start
Also deny benefits for refusal to fill a vacancy resulting from a labor strike
States may repeal their UI laws at their own discretion, and
Additional employer rate reductions must be based on experience rating.
Reasonable additional federal requirements were added in the 1940s and 1950s regarding:
Interstate claims rights
Rules for combining earnings from multiple employers to gain entitlement
Broadened coverage
Approved training participants are UI eligible
Denial of benefits to workers who are not legal residents with employment privileges
Also, states must participate in the Extended Benefits (EB) program.
Somewhat intrusive additional federal requirements since the 1950s:
Intervening work required for requalification
Denial to professional athletes
Benefit reduction for pension income
Restrictions motivated by a desire to conserve funds in the federal budget have been:
The Unified Budget Act of 1969
Federal eligibility requirements for extended benefits
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
Profiling all new claimants for those most likely to exhaust benefits
Requiring states to make withholding of federal income tax possible for beneficiaries 
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Table 6.  A Taxonomy of Training Types
Training for reemployment usually refers to short-term job skill training to increase
readiness for local job vacancies.  Skill training is intended to address unemployment which is due
to a structural mismatch between job seekers and job vacancies.  
Skill training
Provided in group setting is called institutional or classroom and may concern skills in
general demand or it may be customized to fill the request for an employer with available job
slots.  
Alternatively, skill training may be chosen by the participant from courses available at
established training or educational institutions (vo chers).  
Skill training may also be provided in an experiential private sector workplace setting
through on-the-job training (OJT ). 
When OJT is provided through a public agency, it is sometimes called work experience.
Remedial Training
General training which seeks to remedy basic gaps in reading and mathematics skills to
make job seekers ready for skill training.  This is often provided through local school districts with
funding from federal, state, and local sources.  
Classroom soft training
Provides knowledge about workplace behavior skills or job search skills.  
Public Service Employment (PSE)
PSE was most recently available in the United States under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA), 1973.  It involves work experience on public services or
works projects.  It may provide some skill training, but the main aim is income transfer and
arresting the deterioration of workplace behaviors due to prolonged unemployment.  
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Table 7.  A Chronology of Training in the United States
Program Training Types Eligibility Intergovernmental Relations
Manpower Development and 
Training Act (MDTA), 1962
Institutional and on-the-job
training (OJT). 
Low-income and welfare
recipients.
Federal funding granted
directly from 12 regional
offices to agencies in local
areas.  Administration and
reporting structures similar. 
Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA),
1973
On-the-job training, classroom
skill training, classroom soft
training, work experience in
public agencies, and Public
Service Employment (PSE)
Training was targeted to low-
income persons, welfare
recipients, and disadvantaged
youth.
Federal funding flowed to
prime sponsors in substate
r gions which numbered about
470.  Performance monitoring
with results reported to the
U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL).
Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA), 1982
On-the-job training, classroom
skill training, classroom soft
training, and work experience
in public agencies.
Low-income, public assistance
recipients, dislocated workers,
and disadvantaged youth.
Federal funding through state
governors to private industry
councils (PICs) in each of 600
service delivery areas.  PIC
performance reports to
governors who reported to
USDOL.
Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA), 1998
On-the-job training,
customized classroom skill
training, classroom soft
training, and work experience
in public agencies
Access to core services like job
search skills and job referral is
unrestricted. Training is
targeted to the most difficult to
reemploy.
Like JTPA, but PICs now
workforce development boards
with dominant private sector
make-up.  Monitoring is
minimized
